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ABSTRACT
The price of mercury, for several years a stable quantity, increased from
$228 per flask at the end of 1963 to $725 by June 25, 1965 and has remained,
by previous standards, at a very high level since that time. This thesis
proposes to investigate the causes and effects of such a price rise. It is
limited generally to a consideration of the mercury industry in the United
States.
Mercury mining has been recorded in Europe for over 2300 years and spread
to the Western Hemisphere in 1571. Large-scale mining has taken place in the
United States since 1850. Deposits are largely limited to the western portion
of the nation. Cinnabar is the primary ore of mercury and is genetically of
epithennal origin, typical of volcanic or hot spring activity. Erosion is an
adverse influence upon preservation of such deposits.
Mining is generally by either open-pit or underground methods. Refining
is by mercury vapor condensation through a retort system. Costs are increasing
yearly and may vary between $28 and $40 per ton of ore, yielding an average of
about seven pounds of mercury.
The price changes since 1963 were caused by an imbalance of supply and
demand and their subsequent adjustments. Scarce supply was due to labor
difficulties and mine closings brought about by years of low prices and rising
costs. Adequate reserves also were not being developed. High demand levels
were caused by depleted inventories and large purchases for new caustic soda
and chlorine facilities.
To predict a future long-run price, quarterly data compiled by the U. S.
Bureau of Mines were subjected to regression analysis. Projected usage data
also were analysed. The most reasonable price forecast on this basis is $424.20.
Industry sources, on the average, predict a price of $406. The writer concludes
that a realistic forecast is $400 per flask. Recommendations for additional
research are made.
Thesis Supervisor: William H. Dennen
Title: Associate Professor of Geology and Geophysics
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
What causes a commodity market to run wild and in what condition will it
be when it settles down? Often asked about the stock markets, this question
will now be asked of the mercury market. Mercury miners, brokers, and consumers
have all tried to find the solution. Depending upon the answer he receives,
the miner may expand his operations or possibly not open his mine at all. The
broker may enter or refuse to enter into new contracts at given prices. The
consumer will replenish his inventories or deplete them.
In recent years prior to 1963, the mercury market had been one of the
more stable of the metal markets. Prices had been slowly declining from 1955,
but fluctuations were minimal. The average price for 1963 was $189.45 and a
mild upturn had raised the year's final price to $228. By June 25, 1965,
however, the market price had soared to $725.
This thesis is an investigation into the causes and possible consequences
of this price rise. In search of an answer many facets of the mercury industry
must be examined. Chapter II investigates mercury's recent record of price
stability and the effect of its dramatic instability upon those involved in
the market. It also sets forth the purpose and limitations of this thesis.
Chapter III traces the geographic development of mercury mining from Europe
into the United States and shows the physical magnitude and distribution of the
mining industry. The geology and mineralogy of mercury deposits are discussed
in Chapter IV, which also contrasts some major deposits with some that are
marginal. Chapter V examines the mining and milling processes and the costs
involved.
Price behavior from the turn of the twentieth century to the present is
discussed in Chapter VI. The succeeding chapter looks at recent trends and
future prospects for each of the usage categories defined by the U. S. Bureau
of Mines.
The heart of this investigation lies in Chapter VIII is which the
quantitative analysis is pursued and in Chapter IX where the conclusion of the
analysis is presented, along with a criticism of methods and recomnendations
for further research.
The writer wishes to express his gratitude to his thesis advisor,
Dr. William H. Dennen, for his guidance and criticisms; to Mr. George T. Engel
of the U. S. Bureau of Mines in Washington for making available quarterly
reports which could not be located elsewhere; and to the large number of
individuals and firms who made available data, often confidential, from which
to draw in writing this thesis. Special appreciation is due the writer's wife,
Marcia, for her patience and encouragement.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND
Price Stability
Not until 1951 did the current dollar New York price of mercury reach a
yearly average of over $200 per flask.1 In fact, in the twenty years previous,
the average price per flask of mercury exceeded $100 only in the war years of
1939-1945.
In the thirteen year period, 1951-1963, the price of mercury has averaged
$223.81 per flask. Table I lists the average current dollar New York price
for each of these years.
Table I2
Price of Mercury, 1951-1963
Average New York
Price per Flask
(Current Dollars)
$210.13
199.10
193.03
264.39
290.35
259.92
246.98
Year
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
Average New York
Price per Flask
(Current Dollars)
$229.06
227.48
210.76
197.61
191.21
189.45
1. The market unit for mercury is the 76-pound "flask." (2.8 quarts)
2. Engineering and Mining Journal, Feb. 1966, p. 76c.
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
Thus, it would appear that recent prices through 1963 could be character-
ized as stable, though slowly decreasing. It may be noted that, from 1956,
the year-to-year annual decrease in price never exceeded $20 and averaged only
$10.09 per year.
By the standards of other mineral prices in that period, this stability
was indeed remarkable. The following table indicates price stability for that
period.
Mineral
Mercury
Copper
(Domestic
Refinery)
Copper
(Foreign
Refinery)
Lead
Zinc
Tin
Silver
Aluminum
Table II
Stability of Mineral Prices, 1956-19633
Year of Maximum
Change in Price Change in Price
1957-8 $-17.92
1956-7 -12.24
1956-7
1957-8
1956-7
1960-1
1961-2
1961-2
-13.27
-2.55
-2.09
+11.87
+16.07
-1.58
% Change
-7.26%
-29.3%
-32.9%
-17.4%
-15.5%
+11.7%
+17.4%
-6.20%
3. Calculated from statistics in Engineering and Mining Journal, Feb. 1966,
p. 76c.
Standard
Deviation
22.42
4.30
4.43
3.14
.92
7.93
12.78
1.01
With the background of recent stable and slowly decreasing prices, why
then did the average price of mercury jump from $189.45 in 1963 to $315.79 in
1964 and to $570.75 in 1965,4 - - a total increase of 201%? Why did the price
of mercury rise as high as $725.00 on June 25, 1965?5 More important from an
economic viewpoint, what price level can be expected to prevail in the future?
Will the price decline to the 1963 level?
Impact of Price Instability
The answers to the latter questions will affect the mine operator, the
metal broker, the industrial consumer, and the government. It is to them that
the findings of this thesis could be most beneficially directed.
The mine operator must be able to justify the cost of capital improvements
on the basis of anticipated future revenues. In the extreme case, is the mineral
deposit which is not economic at $200 but which could yield a respectable profit
at, say, $500 worth developing today? In the time required to develop such a
property, will the increased production from presently operating mines and from
mines which had reopened because of elevated prices lead to so high a level of
output that the price of mercury will be forced to a level uneconomic for this
property? Where will an equilibrium be reached?
The metal broker, like the stockbroker, must be able to advise his clients
on the state of the market. Also, most metal brokers stock trading inventories
which are subject to constant revaluation. Their own profits depend upon proper
estimation of the market.
4. Ibid.
5. Idem. p. 76d.
Since industrial consumers may buy several months requirements of mercury
at one time, the timing of such a purchase can be critical. Inventory policies
must be affected by price trends. Furthermore, if an extended period of elevated
prices is foreseen, it may be to a company's advantage to "engineer" mercury out
of its products and find a substitute. Frequently, however, as will be dis-
cussed in a later section, this is practically impossible. Alternatively, the
price of the manufactured product may be adjusted, leading possibly to competi-
tive repercussions for that product.
Finally, the prevailing price level of mercury will have an impact on
governmental actions. In general, the government will favor price stability.
If prices are considered unduly low, a price support program could be initiated,
as was in effect from July,1954 through December, 1958. If prices are deemed
too high, one alternative action is the sale of mercury from government inven-
tories. This course was taken, when on December 23, 1964, the General Services
Administration announced that it would open bids on January 15, 1965 on the sale
of 4,000 flasks of mercury.6
Other possible governmental actions include restrictions on foreign trade
and special tax legislation. The extent to which the government seeks stability
in mineral prices is indicated by the great lengths to which it went to obtain
the repeal of price increases which had been announced by the copper, steel, and
aluminum industries.
Neither the government, the consumer, the broker, nor the miner is indepen-
dent from one another in the structure of the mercury industry. All are inter-
related elements. Thereby, any discussion of the mercury market from the point
6. Bureau of Mines Mineral Yearbook, 1964, Vol. 1, p. 862.
of view of one element must necessarily incorporate the effect of the market
on each of the other elements. It is hoped that by pursueing the discussion
from the point of view of the primary source of mercury--the miner--that little
loss of generality will result.
The primary problem is that of forecasting a price level that will pre-
vail some years from now. Each element of the interdependent system is related
to price. Each influences and is influenced by the price. How much longer must
the sale of mercury from government stockpiles continue? Should mercury be
replaced by other materials in manufactured products? Will the demand for
mercury be such that metal brokers cannot fill all orders? Just as the answers
to each of the questions depends on the price of mercury, the price depends on
each of the answers. The mine operator must consider all of these when he con-
templates, "Shall I develop this mineral deposit which was not economic last
year? Will it be economic next year?"
Purpose and Scope of Thesis
This thesis proposes to investigate the long-run price prospects for
mercury and their effect on the mine that previously had been marginal.
In order that the scope of the investigation be kept within manageable
limits, certain restrictions have been imposed. Most important is that the
emphasis is placed heavily on the mercury industry of the United States, although
Spain and Italy both produce more mercury than does the United States. Addi-
tionally, the U.S.S.R., Communist China, Yugoslovia, and Mexico all produce
mercury in major quantities.
Thus sales of foreign mercury to foreign consumers are not considered.
Sales of such mercury to American consumers are incorporated as imports. They
are one of the three important supply determinants of price. The influence upon
price of stimulated foreign production is not explicitly considered. The
primary cause for this restriction is the absence of available data on marginal
productive capacity in these countries.
Mercury mined in the U.S.S.R. or Communist China is not generally sold out-
side the Communist bloc. Thus its effect on price is not significant, excepting
that it may be "dumped" to bring foreign exchange into the Communist bloc. Indi-
cators are, however, that dumping is, for all practical purposes, non-existent.
The Engineering and Mining Journal cites large Eastern European purchases from
the Western European producers.7 Indeed, this is one of the reasons for the
current high level of prices.
Production from Spain, Italy, and other major nations do affect the world
price. Although some term contracts do exist, nearly all mercury is sold in
accordance with either New York or London price quotation. Because of the
leveling effects of speculation, the difference between the New York and London
quotations is almost never greater than the cost of tariffs and trans-Atlantic
shipping. In the thirteen year period, 1951-1963, the New York price exceeded
the London price by an average of only $12.668 (Range: $21.24 (1956)--$.54
(1954)). The tariff for importing mercury into the United States is $19 per
flask.
However, the average difference in 1964 between the New York price and the
lower London quotation was $32.52.9 At one point during that year the difference
7. Engineering and Mining Journal, Feb. 1966, p. 118.
8. Calculated from average prices of Bureau of Mines Mineral Yearbooks.
9. Ibid.
was nearly $100. By June, 1965, the London price had exceeded New York's
quotation by the same amount.10 These variations are attributable to the insta-
bility of a rapidly rising market.
Nevertheless, despite the recent differences, in the long-run the London
and New York prices may be expected to generally be no further apart then the
costs of tariffs and transportation. Hence, the qualification that all prices
in this thesis be New York quotations will not have a harmful effect.
Therefore, the limitations in the scope of this investigation may be sum-
marized as follows. It is assumed that the United States consumption of mercury
is satisfied by United States mine production, secondary production, and by
imports; that United States supply (including imports) and demand interact,
possibly incorporating a time lead or lag, with a United States price which is
equivalent to the world price; and that data for the United States industry are
capable of analysis for future trends in the United States industry.
10. Engineering and Mining Journal, Feb. 1966, p. 116.
CHAPTER III
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF MERCURY MINING
One of the determinants of priceing is the structure of the industry. In
showing the structure, something must be said about the history of the mercury
industry.
History of Usage
Mercury is believed to have been known to man since prehistoric times. A
vessel containing mercury, found in a grave at Kurna in Mespotamia, was deter-
mined to be about 3500 years old. The use of mercury by priests was described
by Aristotle nearly 2300 years ago.
Nineteen hundred years ago mercury was known to have been used in the
amalgamation and refining of gold and in silvering; and its primary ore, cinna-
bar, was used for medicine and pigments. At that time, cinnabar was mined at
the Almaden mine in Spain under an exclusive license from the Roman Government
and was transported from where it was refined by retorting.
Through the Middle Ages mercury was in large demand by alchemists for its
characteristic fusibility. Because of their experimentation, the physical
properties of mercury were well-known by the sixteenth century.
The Spanish discoveries of large gold and silver deposits in Mexico and
South America in that century and the need for mercury as an amalgamating agent
created the first large-scale demand for the metal.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, mercury was in large demand
for the manufacture of thermometers and other scientific instruments. In 1799,
mercury fulminate was invented and the use of mercury became widespread in the
preparation of explosives. In the 1890's, electrolytic mercury cells were first
utilized to produce chlorine and caustic soda. This process has become a major
consumer of mercury.
Within the twentieth century, mercury has found important new uses in
dental preparations, medicines, anti-fouling and mildew-proofing paints, lamps,
fungicides, the electronics industry, and so forth. Present-day uses of mer-
cury will be discussed in greater detail in a later chapter.
Political Domination of Mining
The production of mercury has always been characterized by the domination
of a very small number of major mines. Thus mercury as a conmodity has been
frequently subject to cartels and other artificial means of controlling pro-
duction.
Mercury production began at the Almaden mine, in Cuidad Real Province,
Spain, as early as 400 B.C. Operated under Iberian, Roman and Moorish control
until 1151 A.D., the mine was transferred to the Knights Templars by Alfonso
VII in that year and was later transferred to the military-religious Order of
Calatrava.
The government of Spain repossessed the mine and subsequently leased it,
for 120 years, to the Fugger brothers of Germany in 1525. Since the expiration
of that lease the mine has been operated directly by an agency of the Spanish
Government. In 1923, the furnaces built in 1651 were replaced. Production in
1961 was estimated as 50,000 flasks.
Until 1470, Almaden was virtually the only producer of mercury for western
civilization. In 1470, the orebody of the Idria mine was discovered in the
foothills of the Julian Alps, 25 miles northeast of Trieste. Production began
shortly thereafter. Having once been, for many years, the only major source
of mercury in Europe outside Spain, Idria has often been a source of political
contention, having been variously under Venetian, Italian, Austrian, and
Yugoslavian ownership. Control currently rests with the latter nation. Idria's
1961 production was about 15,000 flasks. Cumulative total output has been
2.5 million flasks.
Western Hemisphere Production
Western hemisphere production of mercury was first started in 1571 with
the discovery of the Santa Barbara orebody in the Department of Huancavelica,
Peru. Between 1571 and 1790, primarily, 1,470,000flasks of mercury were mined.
Attempts to discover additional deposits at the mine have repeatedly failed.
California
Within the United States, itself, mercury was first discovered in 1834,
by the Spanish explorers and settlers in the New Almaden area of California.
The very rich orebodies of New Almaden were not found, however, until 1845.
Large-scale mining was started five years later.
The New Idria orebody was reportedly discovered in 1853 by Mexican prospec-
tors. Mining operations were begun the following year and have been essentially
continuous since that time.
Gold discoveries in California from 1849 through the 1860's and the gold
mining industry which was subsequently developed provided the impetus for the
growth of mercury mining in that state. Mercury amalgamation was the principal
process for separating native gold from its host rock in most mines.
In addition to the New Almaden district (Santa Clara County, California)
and the New Idria district (San Benito and Fresno Counties), the major proper-
ties discovered through the 1860's include Guadalupe (Santa Clara County),
Abbott (Lake County), Gibraltar (Santa Barbara County), Knoxville and Manhatten
(Napa County), Oceanic and Klan (San Luis Obispo County), Manzonita (Colusa
County), and St. Johns (Solano County). In the 1870's the Great Western, Helen,
and Sulphur Bank mines of Lake County were brought into production, along with
other smaller properties.
With one exception, no significant mercury deposits had been discovered in
California since 1895. Only the Challenge Mine of the Emerald Lake district,
San Mateo County, has been located since that time. It was discovered in 1955.
All other discoveries have been in the form of additional orebodies at older
mines.
Records show that California's mercury production in 1850 was 7,773 flasks.
In the following year production was increased to 27,962 flasks. A peak was
reached in 1876 and 1877 with production of 73,194 flasks and 79,917 flasks,
respectively.I (Records of national mercury production from 1910 show at no
time a greater level of production.)2 The bulk of this output was utilized by
the gold mining industry. Production in 1965 from California was 13,404 flasks,
68.5% of the national total. 3
Oregon
Despite the extensive mercury industry that has been built up in California
by 1865, it was not until that year that mercury was found outside the state,
with the discovery of the Nonpareil and Bonanza mines in Douglas County,
Oregon; and it was not until 1877 and 1879, respectively, that these properties
were developed. Mercury mining in Oregon reached a peak in 1940 when twenty-
1. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury Potential of the United States, 1965, p. 89,
Output adjusted to flasks of 76 pounds.
2. Ibid. p. 9.
3. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury in the First Quarter of 1966, p. 4.
three operating mines produced 9,043 flasks. 4 Output in 1965 was 1,364 flasks,
7% of the national total. 5
Utah
In 1873 an occurrence of cinnabar was reported in the Camp Floyd district
of Utah. Production did not begin in Utah until 1881, when a small quantity
was extracted from the Lucky Boy mine. Peak production occurred in 1905 when
1,118 flasks were obtained, all as a by-product from-the Sacramento Gold mine. 6
No mercury has been mined in Utah since 1942.
Nevada
Two years after its discovery in Utah, Mercury was found in Nevada. There
was no significant production, however, until deposits near Ione were developed
in 1909. Peak production did not occur until 1960 when 7,821 flasks were re-
torted. 7 Output in 1965 was 3,333 flasks, 17% of the nation's total. 8
Arizona
The first discovery of cinnabar in Arizona was in 1878 in the Dome Rock
Mountains. Mining in that area was begun twenty years later. Production has
never been great, amounting to less than 7,500 flasks in sixty-eight years.9
Only 158 flasks, less than 1% of the total United State's output, were produced
in 1965.10
4. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury Potential of the U. S., 1965, p. 301.
5. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury in the First Quarter of 1966, p. 4.
6. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury Potential of the U. S., 1965, p. 353.
7. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury Potential of the U. S., 1965, p. 218.
8. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury in the First Quarter of 1966, p. 4.
9. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury Potential of the U. S., 1965, p. 61.
10. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury in the First Quarter of 1966, p. 4.
Alaska
The presence of mercury in Alaska was noted in literature as early as 1884.
Development was minimal, however, until the Red Devil and De Coursey Mountain
mines were opened during World War II. The year of maximum production was 1951,
with 5,461 flasks. Output in 1964 was 303 flasks, and 1965 figures are with-
held by the Bureau of Mines to avoid disclosure of individual company
confidential data. 12
Texas
Although the Indians of the Big Bend region had used cinnabar for making
red war paint, mercury ore was not found in Texas by prospectors until the
discovery on California Mountain. Mining began in 1897 and was continuous
through 1945. After that time, the level of prices supported mining only in
the years 1951, 1953, 1955-1960, and 1965. Peak production was 10,640 flasks
in 1917.13 Recent figures are withheld by the Bureau of Mines to protect
individual company confidential data.
Idaho
The Hermes mine, in Valley County, was the site of the first discovery of
cinnabar in Idaho, in 1902. The earliest recorded production was 1917, when
five flasks of mercury were extracted from that mine. 1 4  1943 was probably
11. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury Potential of the U. S., 1965, p. 33.
12. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury in the First Quarter of 1966, p. 4.
13. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Yearbook, 1960, Vol. 1, p. 787.
14. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury Potential of the U. S., 1965, p. 208, 212.
the year of Idaho's greatest production with 4,261 flasks.15 In 1965, 1,119
flasks were produced, 5.7% of the country's total. 16
Washington
In the state of Washington, mercury was not found until 1913 when Edward
Barnum noticed cinnabar in a coal seam, southeast of Morton in Lewis County.
In 1916 a retort furnace was erected there and the first flasks of mercury were
produced. Maximum production probably occurred in 1929 with 1,397 flasks. 1 7
Production, since World War II, has been limited to the years 1957, 1958, and
1965.18 Since 1935, production figures have been withheld to protect individual
company confidential data.
Arkansas and Others
A latecomer to the ranks of mercury states is Arkansas, where mercury was
first discovered and produced in 1931. Peak output was 2,392 flasks in 1942.19
No production has been reported by the Bureau of Mines since 1946.
Occurrence of mercury minerals have, in addition, been reported in the
states of Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming. No pro-
duction has ever been reported in these states, however.
15. Ibid. p. 208.
16. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury in the First Quarter of 1966, p. 4.
17. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury Potential in the U. S., 1965, p. 354.
18. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury in the First Quarter of 1966, p. 4.
19. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Yearbook, 1960, Vol. 1, p. 787.
For the United States as a whole, mercury production was greatest in the
1870's and was almost entirely from California. This was a period during which
the United States was the world leader in the production of gold20 and in
which amalgamation with mercury was the primary method for separating native
gold from its host rock. (The cyanide process for recovering gold was not put
into use until about 1900.)21
Distribution of Production
Production figures for individual years are generally available only for
the years after 1910.22 Periods of high production relative to preceding and
following years occurred in 1912, 1916-1918, 1929-1932, 1940-1945, and 1957-
1961. Lowest production occurred during the periods 1914, 1921-1927, 1933,
1949-1951, and 1964.23
Production in 1965 was from eight states--each of those just reviewed,
except Arkansas and Utah. Eight mines located in Alaska, California, Idaho,
and Nevada supplied over 84 per cent of the 3,955 flasks of mercury produced
in the first quarter of the year.24
Of the 14,142 flasks produced in 1964, three mines--the New Idria and the
Buena Vista in California and the Cordero in Nevada--produced 75 per cent.
Along with eight other mines--five in California, two in Alaska, and one in
20. Ryan, J. P., "Gold," Mineral Facts and Problems, U. S. Bureau of Mines
Bulletin 585, 1960, p. 347.
21. Homestake Mining Co., The Homestake Story, Lead, S.D., 1960, p. 7.
22. 1910 was the founding year of the U. S. Bureau of Mines.
23. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 1960, Vol. 1, p. 787.
24. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury in the First Quarter of 1965, p. 3.
Nevada--they accounted for 95 per cent of the national total. The remaining
5 per cent was divided among an additional 61 mines--32 of them in California
and 19 in Nevada. These two states produced 96 per cent of the nation's
mercury in 1964--73 and 23 per cent respectively.25
Summary
The structure of the American mercury mining industry emerges as the
following: All mines are located in the western portion of the Unites States
and cinnabar deposits having any potential conercial value are entirely unknown
east of Arkansas. Except for some California mines, the industry is less than
a century old. (In contrast, the Almaden mine of Spain, still the world's
largest producing mine, has been in operation over 2300 years.)
Structure of Mining Industry
Production is dominated by a few large mines and a moderate number of
medium-sized mines. The bulk, however, are mines which produce fewer than
100 flasks yearly and might, therefore, be considered marginal operations which
would be profitable only under favorable economic conditions.
The Bureau of Mines statistics clearly show the dominance of the larger
mines. 26  (Table III).
25. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, 1964, p. 862.
26. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mineral Yearbooks, 1960-1964, Vol. 1.
Table III
Distribution of Mercury Production in the United States
Production of 1000 Flasks or More
No. of Mines
3
3
% of National
Production
75
89
90
92
85
States
Calif., Nev.
Calif., Nev.
Calif., Nev.
Calif., Nev.
Calif., Nev.
Production of
100-999 Flasks
No. of
Mines
8
5
4
10
14
% of
Nat. Prod.
20
8
7
6
13
On a world-wide basis, a similar
number of nations which account for a
few more nations produce only a small
orebodies whatsoever.
Figures for 196527 showed that a
Mexico, Spain, the United States, the
27. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury in
State
3
4
1
(Calif.)
4
4
Production of less
than 100 Flasks
No. of
Mines Nat.
of
Prod. State
pattern can be noted. There are a small
large percentage of world production. A
percentage and even more have no commercial
mere seven nations--Communist China, Italy,
U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia--account for nearly
the First Quarter of 1966., p. 5.
Year
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
Year
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
95 per cent of world production. The remainder is divided among only eleven
other nations. Tunisia, for example, is the only producing nation in Africa,
yet produced only 174 flasks. Bailey and Smith28 state that "Of the entire
world production ...three-fourths (has come) from only six mines or districts."
Statistics such as these would infer that there are a few large orebodies,
but that the vast majority are not of this class. Most would be only small
deposits or larger deposits that are now nearly exhausted. These would be
expected to support marginal operations only under favorable economic con-
ditions.
In appraising these operations one should have a clear understanding of
the geologic nature of deposits from which mercury can be extracted.
28. Bailey, Edgar, H., and Roscoe M. Smith, "Mercury--Its Occurrence and
Economic Trends," Geological Survey Circular 496, Washington: U. S.
Geological Survey, 1964, p. 2.
CHAPTER IV
GEOLOGY OF MERCURY DEPOSITS
Mercury ores are generally of two mineralogic types: 1) Native mercury
(Hg) or 2) Cinnabar (HgS). The latter is, by far, the more important source
and contains 86.2 per cent mercury. Although other mercury minerals do occur,
these are comparatively quite rare.
Genesis and Its Implications for Exploration
Economic geologists agree that mercury-bearing bodies are generally of
an "epithermal" type; that is, they are deposits formed near the surface by
ascending thermal waters and in genetic association with igneous rocks.
LindgrenI declares that "the uniform character of the quicksilver deposits
points to a conmon genesis for all of them... Their structure indicates
deposition near the surface, as does also the physiographic evidence at many
places...
"When it is noted that hot springs and volcanic surface flows are present
in almost all regions of importance (except at Almaden and Idria,) and that
cinnabar in considerable quantities is associated with hot spring deposits,
the argument becomes very strong indeed that such solutions have formed the
majority of the deposits. For the few deposits that have no such clear connection
with volcanic rocks, the characteristic mineral association still holds good,
and we are forced to the hypothesis that volcanism and hot-spring action are
the causes of these also, though the products of the igneous activity may have
1. Lindgren, Waldemar, Mineral Deposits, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
Inc. , 1933, p. 471.
failed to reach the surface and the hot springs may have subsided."
Since, typically, cinnabar bodies are associated with hot springs and
volcanism, areas of recent tectonic and volcanic activity, such as the western
portion of the United States, provide a very favorable environment for the
existence of economic orebodies.
Of major importance is the shallowness characteristic of mercury deposits.
Bailey and Smith2 point out that half of the domestic mines which have yielded
over 100 flasks of mercury are less than 200 feet deep and that only six of
the larger domestic mines are more than 1000 feet deep. Lindgren3 also notes
that very few deposits have been profitable to a depth of 1,500 feet.
A major effect of such a characteristic is to severely limit the extent
of potential ore reserves at mercury mines. The only likelihood of ore at
depths greater than, say, 2000 feet would be that it be part of a very large
body never exposed to surface erosion. This would seem improbable.
Another effect is the restriction which it places upon exploration. The
absence of erosion is a critical factor in the preservation of these near-
surface deposits. Consequently, areas where older rocks are exposed through
erosion can almost certainly be excluded from consideration.
Bailey and Smith4 further emphasize these factors by concluding that
"it would be useless to look for epithermal mercury deposits in any of the
major regions of the United States other than those in which mercury has already
been formed."
2. Bailey and Smith, Op. cit., p. 1.
3. Lindgren, Op. cit., p. 465.
4. Bailey and Smith, Op. cit. p. 1.
Structurally, the most productive deposits are generally typified by
major folding and faulting and by numerous shear and facture zones. These would
develop permeability for the mercury-bearing solutions. Also characteristic of
major mercury orebodies are rock alterations, frequently of a silica-carbonate
type. The presence of such alteration is a very favorable indicator in many
mercury districts in California.5
The massiveness of mineralization is a guide to the richness of the
deposit. Widespread areas of mineralization, in zones, veins, or fracture
fillings offer, at a minimum, production potential of lower grade material and
indicate the possible existence of high-grade deposits. Where mineralization
consists only of cinnabar stains and thin fracture coatings and lacks areas of
local enrichments, mining can be economic only at elevated prices.
Mineralogy
Mineralogically, the primary ore of mercury is cinnabar (HgS). Except,
as noted below, orebodies are mined for mercury along; nor is mercury obtained
as a by-product in the mining of other ores. Therefore, mining activity is a
function of the price of mercury only, and not of the price of other ores.
The rare exceptions to the isolation of mercury from other ores are in Chile,
Czechoslovakia, and Tunisia where very minor amounts are mined as by-products of
gold, iron, and lead, respectively. Ores from Huitzuco, Mexico yield both
mercury and antimony. The ores of the Red Devil Mine, in Alaska, contain more
antimony than mercury. However, the antimony is not recovered from the ore.6
5. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury Potential of the United States, p. 14.
6. Bailey and Smith, Op. cit., p. 2.
Geologic Examples
Despite generalities, no two orebodies are exactly alike. Brief sketches
of a few individual deposits may serve as examples of the variations encoun-
tered.
Spain
The richest mercury mine in the world is the Almaden in Spain. Even though
it has been worked for over 2,000 years, it is, according to Bateman,7 "capable
of supplying the world for the next 100 years."
The ore occurs as cinnabar replacement of sandstone grains in three
factured beds of steeply dipping Silurian quartzite, separated by bituminous
slates. The orebeds may attain a maximum width of 25 meters and in several
places average 20 per cent mercury. The richest portions of the deposit occur
as massive bands of cinnabar. The low-grade portions occur as stringers and
inclusion of mercury minerals in the quartzite.
Diabase dikes are present near the deposit. Van der Veen8 correlates
these with Tertiary diabase dikes common in many parts of Spain and proposes
that the cinnabar replacement ores are probably of the same age.
Italy
Other mercury orebodies are formed by the filling of pores and cavities
rather than by replacement. Typical of these are the Italian ores. At Idria,
the ore is richest in open-textured sandstones, rich in the dolomite breccia,
and lean in the bedding planes and small fractures of the bedded dolomite.
7. Bateman, Alan M., Economic Mineral Deposits, New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1950, p. 615.
8. Van der Veen, R. W., "The Almaden mercury ores and their connection with
igneous rocks." Economic Geology, Vol. 19, March 1924, pp. 146-156.
Lindgren9 considers the deposition "certainly post-Cretaceous, probably
Tertiary."
At Monte Amiata, the late Pliocene ores are primarily low-temperature,
hydrothermal fillings of solution cavities, crushed zones, sandstone pores, and
especially of trachyte conglomerate. They lie at intersections of minor
fractures with a major fracture that cuts Mesozoic and Tertiary sediments
capped by a trachtye flow from the Monte Amiata volcano.
United States
In the United States, mercury deposits are limited almost entirely to the
youngest tectonic region of the nation. They are found primarily in Alaska
and in a belt west of the Rocky Mountains. Isolated deposits have been
located also in Texas and in Arkansas.
In California can be found almost all of the various types of structures
associated with mercury deposits. Slightly more than half of the deposits
occur in altered serpentine (silica-carbonate rock.) (Minerals formed by
alteration of this rock include quartz, chalcedony, calcite, dolomite, and
other carbonates.) Another 30 per cent are found in the sedimentary rocks of
the Franciscan Group. (Upper Jurassic?) with which the serpentine is
associated. 10
Deposition in the serpentine and in the Franciscan Group has been favored
by extensive facturing where the mercury minerals have formed in the inter-
stices of porous or brecciated rocks. Especially rich deposits have been found
9. Lindgren, Op. cit., p. 467.
10. Davis, Fenelon F., "Mercury" from: California Division of Mines, "Mineral
Commodities of California," Bullentin 176, Dec., 1957, p. 341,(pp. 341-356).
beneath shales, volcanic flows, fault gouge and other materials which act as
an impermeable barrier above the porous zone and thus trap ascending metal-
liferous solutions.
Mercury bodies in California occur also in the Knoxville (Upper Jurassic)
sedimentary rocks, and in younger Lower Cretaceous sedimentary and Tertiary vol-
canic rocks. Small amounts of cinnabar have been obtained from placer and
hot spring deposits.1
New Almaden
New Almaden, although no longer a significant producer, is the most
prolific mine in the United States in terms of culmulative production. The
mercury deposits are in rocks of the Franciscan Group. These include graywacke,
arkose, sandstone, shale, conglomerate, chert, limestone, altered volcanics,
and some metamorphic rocks.
The area contains a northwest-trending anticline whose southwest limb
has been highly sheared. Two major sills of serpentine appear to have intruded
the northeast limb, converged near the crest of the anticline, and proceded
down the southwest limb. The margins of the sills were later altered to a
silica-carbonate rock and were eventually replaced along a series of northeast-
trending fractures by cinnabar, carried in alkaline solution, to form large,
rich orebodies.
The richness of the bodies was without question largely due to the
presence of the overlying "alta", a slickensided clay, forming a barrier
11. Ibid.
impermeable to the rising alkaline solutions. The largest orebody mined was
200 feet wide, 15 feet thick, and 1500 feet in down-dip length. Over its
productive life, the New Almaden ores have averaged barely under 4 per cent
12
mercury.
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Fig. 1. -- Generalized section through New Almaden mine. California,
along the Day tunnel. Shaded areas indicate the fractured zone; cross-
hatched areas indicate ore; "alta" shown in black. (After C. N. Schuette.)
New Idria
The New Idria mine of California ranks second in total production and
for the last several years has been the American leader in annual production.
The structure of the district is that of a nortdwest-trending, eroded,
assynmetric, anticlinal dome, believed formed by the intrusion of a serpentine
core into the Franciscan sandstone. Above the sandstone are the Panoche
(Upper Cretaceous) shale and sandstone and Tertiary sedimentary rocks. Steep
faults cut the serpentine-Franciscan and Franciscan-Panoche contacts.
At the New Idria mine, on the northeast flank of the dome, the serpentine
and Franciscan sandstone override crumpled Panoche shales along the New Idria
thrust fault. Irregularities in the fault plane determine the shape of the
12. Bailey, E. H. "The New Almaden Quicksilver Mines", California Division
of Mines Bulletin 154, 1951, pp. 263-270.
underlying zone of altered and indurated shales and the configuration of the
orebodies which they contain. Veins and stockworks of fractures filled with
cinnabar comprise most of the ore. Where fracturing has been most intensive,
rich orebodies have been formed. The richest orebody was 300 feet long, 800
feet wide, and 25-150 feet thick. It occupied a steep inverted trough at the
intersection of a tear fault with the New Idria thrust fault.13
Texas and Arkansas
The mercury deposits of Texas and Arkansas are not related geologically
to those west of the Rocky Mountains. The Texan deposits are located primarily
in Brewster County, near the Rio Grande and the Mexican border. They occur
in folded and shattered Cretaceous limestone. The principal producer had been
the Chisos mine where ore was found, along with boulders and clay, in cavities
and caves which occur along fault planes and near the crests of intensively
jointed anticlines. The overlying Del Rio clay acted as an impermeable
barrier to the ascending hydrothermal solutions carrying the cinnabar. Surface
alterations have yielded native mercury, terlinguaite, eglestonite, montroydite,
and calomel. The ores have contained an average of only 0.5 per cent mercury,
although the richest ores can reach 2 per cent.14
Arkansas deposits are very small mineral bodies, the largest being 100 feet
long, 30 feet wide, and 120 feet high. They are usually either pipe-like or
tabular in shape. The former occur at structural intersections and the latter
13. Eckel, E. B., and Myers, W. B., "Quicksilver Deposits of the New Idria
District, San Benito and Fresno Counties, California," California Division
of Mines, Report 42, 1946, pp. 81-124.
14. Bateman, Op. cit., pp. 617-8.
essentially parallel sedimentary bedding. Mineralization is attributed to
solutions ascending major fault planes and spreading out along subordinate
faults and into folds. The host rock is typically a sandstone. Localization
of the mineral bodies was controlled apparently by the increased permeability
of the sandstone as a result of folding and faulting and by a relatively
impermeable shale cap acting as a trap. 15
Marginal Deposits
It is obviously beyond the scope of this investigation to discuss the
geology of each known mercury deposit in the country. A brief description
has been given above of a few mining districts and mines. The staff of the
U. S. Bureau of Mines in Mercury Potential of the United States (1965) has
itemized, by state, 452 mines and prospects and 556 occurrences16 (deposits
with no recorded production) and briefly discusses each of them, giving the
geology, productive history, and conditions of mine workings and equipment,
if any. The reader is referred to that publication for infonnation on specific
deposits and districts.
Since, however, this investigation is concerned largely with marginal
mines, descriptions of two marginal deposits will be cited from that report.
These are not, however, intended to be representative of all marginal mercury
deposits.
15. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury Potential of the United States, 1965, p. 79.
16. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Mercury Potential of the United States, 1965, p. 16.
1
The Helen Mine, California, "is a wide fault zone between serpentine and
Franciscan sandstone which strikes northwest and dips southwest. An irregular,
discontinous ledge of silica-carbonate rock occurs along the footwall of the
fault zone, which ranges in width from a few feet to over 150 feet. Highly
altered basalt dikes occur in the serpentine and the main fault. Principal
orebodies are in silica-carbonate rock, although some ore occurs in dikes and
in the sandstone hanging wall. Ore in the silica-carbonate rock consists of
veinlets and disseminations of cinnabar. Native mercury occurs to a lesser
extent and metacinnabarite and tiemannite have been reported. Disseminations
of cinnabar also occur in the basalt dikes. Grade of the ore ranges from 5 to
15 pounds mercury per ton.
"Mine workings include over 5,000 feet of adits, drifts, and crosscuts
on three main levels, several intermediate adits, and numerous raises, winzes,
and stopes covering a strike length of about 16,000 feet over a vertical range
of 300 feet. Older workings are caved; recent openings on the 70- and 300-
levels are accessible. "7
The mine has produced over 7,000 flasks of mercury in intermittent
operations since 1900.18 The California Division of Mines and Geology reported
that, in 1964, it was under development by the Stauffer Chemical Corporation.19
17. Ibid, p. 108.
18. Idem.
19. Davis, Fenelon F., "Mercury-Volatile in 1964!", Mineral Information Service,
California Division of Mines and Geology, Vol. 18, No. 2, February, 1965,
p. 25.
The War Eagle Mine, Oregon, has a total production of over 600 flasks. 20
"Two forms of mineralization are present on the property. In the western part,
the Rainier vein is in a fault zone in which cinnabar associated with marcasite
occurs in silicified fault breccia. The ore contains considerable arsenic
which caused some difficulty in the reduction plant. The fault is in the May
Creek schist and strikes N 70* W, dipping steeply toward the northeast. On
the bank of Rattlesnake Creek, cinnabar was found in a 4-foot coal or lignite
seam interbedded in shales and sandstones of the Umpqua Formation. The coal
contains variable amounts of cinnabar.
"The Rainier vein was developed by two adit levels which opened two ore-
bodies; one was 175 feet and the other 200 feet in length. Workings totaled
more than 2,400 feet."21 Reportedly, the mine was being opened in the early
part of 1965.22
20. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Op. cit., p. 324.
21. Ibid., pp. 308-9.
22. Engineering and Mining Journal, Vol. 166, No. 4, April, 1965, p. 154.
CHAPTER V
MINERAL PROCESSING AND ITS ECONOMICS
Having considered the geologic environments of mercury deposits let us
discuss briefly the actual mining and milling of mercury deposits and the
economics thereof.
Mining
Both underground and surface methods are used in mining mercury, the
former accounting for about 90 per cent of total domestic production.
Most of the underground mining is by the square-set stoping method or
some modification thereof, particularly in the larger mines. Shrinkage or
sublevel stoping methods are occasionally used.
Underground mining procedures can yield to 300 tons of ore per day for
treatment at the larger mines. The daily yield of a marginal mine might,
of course, be much less. Production per man-shift averages less than five tons.
Open pit mining is done by the usual drilling, blasting and loading.
Mechanical loaders, or power shovels, usually of less than one-cubic-yard
capacity, load the ore onto dump trucks which transport it to the milling
plant. Open pit mines generally yield up to 175 tons of ore per day, but pro-
ductivity ranges as high as 40 tons per man-shift.
Typical of small-scale open pit operations is that of the Crawfoot Lumber
and Mining Company in the Antelope mining district of Pershing County, Nevada.
There, eight men are employed in round-the-clock ore stripping operations,
1. U. S. Bureau of Mines, "Mineral Facts and Problems," Bulletin 630, 1965,
pp. 573-581.
recovering an estimated 85 per cent of the mercury. The mill has a capacity
of 45 tons per day.2
Milling
Compared to the milling of ores of other metals, the treatment of mercury
ores is relatively very simple, encouraging the marginal operator with only a
minimum amount of capital available for investment.
The initial step in the milling of mercury ore is crushing. Material not
crushed finely enough to pass through a sizing screen can be recycled or, if
of too low a grade, rejected. The material can also be upgraded by hand
sorting. Concentration of material by flotation is efficient and produces a
high-grade concentrate. Flotation, if used, necessities fine grinding and an
ample water supply.
The primary purpose of crushing is to reduce the raw ore to a size suitable
for furnacing. Mercury is extracted from the ore or concentrate by heating in
retorts or furnaces to liberate the metal as a vapor. The vapor is then cooled
and collected as it condenses. The mercury condensate may contain some soot
and dust which can be separated by hoeing the mixture with lime. Mercury from
this operation is clean and sufficiently pure for marketing.
Retorts are inexpensive installations for small operators and require only
simple firing and condensing apparatus. They are best suited to operations
treating 500 tons per day of high-grade sorted ore. One of the most objection-
able and costly features of retorts is the manual charging and removal of
material.
2. Engineering and Mining Journal, Vol. 167, No. 1, January, 1966, p. 128.
In larger operations, either rotary or multiple-hearth furnaces with
mechanical feeding and discharging devices are used. Standard furnace
capacities range from 10 to 100 tons per day or greater.
Mercury can also be extracted for its ore by leaching with a solution
of sodium sulfide and sodium hydroxide and recovered as the metal by
precipitation with aluminum or by electrolysis.3 Leaching of mercury ores
has not been widely utilized because of reagent-consuming constituents in
some ores, irregularities in the compositions of ores, and the cost of fine
grinding. Studies have shown, however, that some of these objections may be
overcome by concentrating the ore by flotation and leaching the resultant
concentrate.
The metallurgical processes by which mercury is extracted from cinnabar
ore, as has just been shown, fairly straightforward and uncomplicated. Unlike
the miners of copper-lead-zinc ores, for example, the operators of mercury
mines can market a refined product of sufficient purity that it may be directly
adapted to almost all end uses.
Cost of Mining
Although the extracting apparatus is relatively inexpensive, this should
not imply that costs are unimportant. The truly marginal operator can be as
easily closed down by rising costs as by falling prices.
The cost of mining one ton of ore sets a lower limit upon the price
acceptable for the amount of metal derived from that ton of ore. This limit
3. Von Bernewitz, M. W., "Occurrences and Treatment of Mercury Ore at Small
Mines," Information Circular 6966, U. S. Bureau of Mines, 1937, 40pp.
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varies from ton to ton in accordance with the grade, or metal content, of the
ore. Grade, therefore, is the measure by which the material which can be mined
at a profit under given price and cost conditions is separated from that which
can not. Only the former can, by definition, be classified as "ore." It is
fallacious to assume should a portion of a cinnabar deposit be classified as
ore, that the full mercury content of that deposit is economically minable.
In the long-run situation, such material as does not meet at least the
variable costs of mining should remain unmined. It is not ore.
All the revenue which the mercury mine operator receives is generated from
the sale of metallic mercury. At no domestic mercury mine is a salable by-
product extracted which would contribute to revenue and counteract low mercury
grades. Mercury, alone, must bear the cost of mining. If the average cost per
ton of ore mined exceeds the average revenue per ton, then the mine will soon
close. And here, also, the "cost of mining" must have an expanded meaning.
The "cost of mining" encompasses not only the labor, materials, power,
and ore haulage actually utilized in the mining operation, but also the fuel,
labor, and material costs of milling. It must provide for depreciation of the
capital equipment used in mining and milling and for its maintenance. It
includes marketing and administrative costs as well as overhead. Mine develop-
ment expenses also must be covered. Taxes, of several types, must be paid.
The mine operator, of course, is entitled to a profit or return on his invest-
ment. Finally, since the ore is not in infinite supply, operations must yield
enough additional income to pay for successful exploration for a new mineral
body of economic value. Without this final item, the company would have to be
liquidated within a few years--generally under ten--due to exhaustion of its
mineral resources.
Each of these items listed above are expenses which must be paid if the
mine is not to go bankrupt. And as previously mentioned, the sole source of
revenue is the sale of extracted mercury.
Whereas price information is readily available from a number of published
sources, cost data are generally regarded as confidential because of the
intense competition faced by most mining concerns.
The cost of mining--in both the broad and the narrow sense--has been
continually rising. The cost of mining, in the narrow sense--per ton of
unconcentrated ore handled--is expected to be approximately of the same order
of magnitude in the case of cinnabar ore as for other ores mined by the same
methods. Strict comparisons among metals, however, is complicated by the
practice of reporting costs in terms of dollars per pound (or ton) of metallic
end-product. Apparent cost differences are created by contrasts in recovery
factors, concentration ratios, and in metalic content of ores. Moreover,
although methods of mining and concentration may be basically alike, the flow
of ore material from unmined ore to final concentrate is generally custom-
designed for each mine. Slight equipment and flow differences will result in
differing efficiencies and thus in cost differences. The flow capacity of the
mine--in tons per day--definitely effects efficiency.
Samuel H. Williston, now president of the American Quicksilver Institute,
told a conmittee of the United States House of Representative that labor costs,
in most underground mines, comprise about 50% of the total mining costs. He
stated, furthermore, that mining costs had tripled between 1939 and 1953.4
4. House of Representatives Select Committee on Small Business, Problems in
the Metal Mining Industry (Lead, Zinc, and Other Metals), Washington:
United States Government Printing Office, 1953, p. 165.
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Little has yet been said about the effects of economics of scale upon
mining costs. Compared to orebodies of other metals, those of mercury have
to be considered small. Costs are thus expected to be higher than the cost
average index for all metals. Relative inefficiency of operation is even
more emphasized for the marginal mine. Of 87 mercury mining establishments
in 1954, 74 had four or fewer employees. 5
Brooks gives the following cost data for mercury mines in 1956 and 1957
and further contrasts the cost problems faced by marginal operators:6 "In
1956, the seven mercury mines producing 74 per cent of domestic output had
average total costs per flask that varied from $163 to $361. The average for
all seven weighted by production was $238. In the following year, the ten
mines producing 80 per cent of domestic output (including the same seven
plus three other mines) had average total costs that varied from $173 to $583.
But the weighted average for all ten was $231, only $60 higher than the lowest
cost producer's average and even lower than the weighted average for 1956,
which indicated that most of the metal was produced in the lower part of the
range. At the same time the more than 100 other operators producing 20 per
cent of the output all had costs at least as high as the upper part of the
cost range for these ten mines."
It should now be apparent that one of the major factors--if not the most
important single factor--in determining the cost of mining is the magnitude of
operations and resulting efficiency of scale. Yet this cannot be synthesized
from any government-published statistical index.
5. Brooks, David B., "The Supply of Individually Mined Minor Metals and Its
Implications for Subsidy Programs," Land Economics, Vol. 40, No. 2, Feb.,
1964, pp. 21-22.
6. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
Although the weighted cost average for all major producers decreased in
1957, it should be noted that costs for the most efficient producer in 1956
increased at least six per cent in the following year. The decreased weighted
average can be accounted for by the most efficient mine's increasing its share
of total production.
Representative Wayne Aspinall (D - Colorado) in a 1966 letter to the
federal government's General Services Administration stated that many United
States mines are not able to produce mercury at under $400 per flask.7
Average mine costs underground in the United States range from $20 to $30
a ton, according to Mr. Samuel H. Williston, President of the American Quick-
silver Institute.8  Surface mining costs plus furnacing costs rarely go below
$8 to $10 per ton including stripping required and unavoidable dilution.
Assuming an average grade of 7.2 pounds per ton of ore (the latest
average grade released by the United States Bureau of Mines--for the year 1964),
the average cost of mining per flask would be $211 to $317 underground and $85
to $105 by surface mining. This would probably be an increase from the 1956-
1957 costs, but like that figure would not be representative of costs at a
marginal mine.
Alex Rorabaugh, the former operator of a small mine in California states,
"a lot (of money) has been spent trying to reopen old workings, core drilling,
putting in new rotary furnances, small retorts, and now leaching plants.
7. E&MJ Mineral Metal Markets, Vol. 40, No. 22, May 30, 1966, p. 3.
8. Williston, S. H., Personal Communication, March 29, 1966.
Right now most are going broke at $375 f.o.b. San Francisco." He believes that
$325 is the minimum market price at which the operators of small mines can
hope to avoid bankruptcy.9
The Buttes Gas and Oil Company, owner of the Gambonini Mine in California,
considers $400 to be the minimum market price at which mining operations would
be feasible. 10
Role of Ore Grade
The average grade of ore that is being mined would be expected to gradually
decrease as reserves are depleted in filling the demands of consumption, barring
the discovery of a major orebody. Data from 1927 through 1964 do not show a
significant trend in this direction, however. Table IV below shows, for the
years 1927-1964, how the average grade of ore mine has varied. It shows also
the variations in the number of flasks produced, the quantity of ore treated,
and in the average price of mercury, in current and constant dollars.
9. Rorabaugh, A. D., Personal Communication, April 1, 1966.
10. Thamer, D. H., Buttes Gas and Oil Company, Personal Communication,
April 25, 1966.
11. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook, Vol. 1, 1960 and 1964.
Table IV
MINE PRODUCTION AND PRICES, 1927-1964
Year
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
Average Grade
of Ore
(Pounds Hg/Ton)
8.1
7.9
6.0
4.9
6.6
8.3
8.2
8.2
8.6
7.5
6.6
6.8
7.3
6.3
5.1
5.1
6.3
9.4
10.8
12.0
12.5
Mine
Production
(Flasks)
11,128
17,870
23,682
21,553
24,947
12,622
9,669
15,445
17,518
16.569
16,508
17,991
18,633
37,777
44,921
50,846
51,929
37,688
30,763
25,348
23,244
Ore Treated
(Short Tons)
99,969
142,131
248,314
288,503
260,471
108,118
78,089
126,931
135,100
141,962
186,578
199,954
191,892
449,940
652,141
733,360
613,111
300,385
209,009
157,469
139,311
Average Price of Mercury
(Constant $)
(Current $) (1957-9=100)
118.16 226
123.51 233
122.15 234
115.01 243
87.35 219
57.93 163
59.23 164
73.87 180
71.99 164
79.92 181
90.18 191
75.47 176
103.94 246
176.87 411
185.02 387
196.35 364
195.21 346
118.36 208
134.89 233
98.24 149
83.74 103
Year
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
Average Grade
of Ore
(Pounds Hg/Ton)
10.2
10.3
9.3
6.5
7.0
7.8
8.1
6.4
7.5
8.4
8.6
8.6
9.7
9.2
13.6
12.8
7.2
Mine
Production
(Flasks)
14,388
9,930
4,535
7,293
12,547
14,337
18,543
18,955
24,177
34,625
38,067
31,256
33,223
31,662
26,277
19,117
14,142
Ore Treated
(Short Tons)
103,220
71,977
35,115
81,067
135,197
138,090
174,083
222,740
244,148
309,632
328,155
275,903
258,071
262,108
146,523
113,539
149,950
Average Price of Mercury
(Constant $)
(Current $) (1957-9=100)
76.49 87
79.46 95
81.26 94
210.13 217
199.10 212
193.03 208
264.39 285
290.35 312
259.92 270
246.98 249
229.06 228
227.48 226
210.76 209
197.61 197
191.21 191
189.45 189
314.79 314
I-
It can be noted that the lowest grades were mined in the years 1929-1930
and 1940-1943. In both periods production, in terms of the quantity of ore
treated, is very high relative to neighboring years. At both times, constant
dollar prices were at unusually high levels. In 1929-1930, mining activity
was spurred by an eight year record of great United States consumption, of which
the domestic mining industry could generally supply no more than 50 per cent.12
The Great Depression had no effect at all upon constant dollar prices for
mercury until 1931 and 1932. The high price of mercury in 1940-1943 was
sustained by the demands of World War II and the limitations on imports from
Spain and Italy, until then the world's greatest mercury producers.
During the 1929-1930 and 1940-1943 periods, therefore, there was great
pressure on the domestic mercury mines to increase production, resulting in
the mining of lower grades of ore and in the initiation of mining activities
at deposits where mineral grades were not otherwise economic. The natural
consequence of these actions was an increase in the amount of ore treated,
at the expense of the average grade of ore. The high prices of those years made
mining such ores economically possible.
The average grade of ore processed is seen to have reached its peak in
1945-1949. Conversely, this was the time in which real prices reached their
lowest levels--the war-created demands had disappeared. (Demand in 1946 fell
to approximately half its 1945 level as previously stockpiled inventories were
depleted.) When both demand and prices fell, a large fraction of the mines
which had operated economically on lower-grade ores during World War II could
12. U. S. Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook 1960, Vol. 1, pp. 784-5.
no longer earn a profit and were forced to close down. The end result was
that lower grade ores could no longer be mined and the average grade of ore
processed had to increase.
Figure 2 shows a fairly strong linear trend of average ore grade vs.
numbers of short tons of ore treated. It is evident that as the average grade
of ore drops, the quantity of ore treated increases, and vice versa. This
indicates that as lesser grades of cinnabar become economic, mines are re-
opened and existing operations are expanded. This, of course, should
correlate with increased price.
A less strongly inverse linear trend is that of average ore grade vs.
mercury production (in flasks)--Figure 3. Such a trend is particularly vague
in the region of low-grade and low production. This would follow from the
simple consideration that, for example, a large tonnage of low grade ore may
yield the same number of flasks of mercury as a small tonnage of high-grade ore.
Thus, because of an inverse linear relationship between ore grade and tonnage
mined, a fairly constant output of mercury might be expected, regardless of
the average grade of ore. Nevertheless, as Figure 3 shows, whenever the grade
has averaged over 10 pounds per ton, output has not been greater than 30,000
flasks. The response of output as a function of price will be examined in a
later section.
Grade-Price Relationship
Above it was suggested that the average grade of ore mined is a function
of price--the average grade decreasing as price increases, and vice versa.
Figure 4 attempts to depict this relationship. It shows average grade as a
function of both current dollar and constant dollar prices. Current dollar
prices are the actural prices paid for mercury as reported yearly by the
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Engineering and Mining Journal. Constant dollar prices are simply current
dollar prices divided by the wholesale price index of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, where 1957-1959 = 100. Both prices are tabulated by the Bureau
of Mines.
Figure 4 shows that any grade of ore, from 4.9 to 12.5 pounds of mercury
per ton, has been mined at a current dollar price between $50 and $140 and
that no significant price-grade relationship is apparent within this bracket.
At higher current prices, however, the lower grades tend to predominate,
indicating new low-grade sources which are economically minable only at the
elevated prices.
When prices are adjusted to a constant dollar basis in Figure 4, the
inverse price-grade relation can be seen much more readily. Although a large
variance is to be expected, a visual line-of-best fit has been passed through
the data.
Its equation is:
Price (in constant $) = 540 - (5 X Ore Grade)
4= x
Fig. + Ore Grade Related to Price, Current and Constant (1957-59=100)
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CHAPTER VI
PRICE BEHAVIOR
Equally as important to the marginal miner as cost is the market price
of mercury. The rise in prices, beginning in 1964, made the mineral deposits
at many closed mines once again appear attractive. A drop in prices, on the
other hand, could just as easily force these mines to again close. Before
discussing the reasons for the recent price increases, it is appropriate to
summarize the past history of mercury prices.
History to 1964
United States primary production of mercury began in California before
1850 and by 1850 and by 1870 had reached 80,000 flasks yearly--more than
present domestic consumption. As previously mentioned, the dominating mines
were New Almaden and New Idria. Before World War I, domestic needs had always
easily been met by domestic mine production. Through 1909, in fact, the
United States exported half of its production. Since then, however, domestic
production has satisfied consumption requirements in only seven years.
The pre-war conditions of self-sufficiency in mercury led to stable
price conditions through 1914, as Table V illustrates. At the outbreak of the
war in 1914, domestic production was 16,000 flasks; imports, 8000 flasks; con-
sumption, 21,000 flasks; and the E&MJ average price was $48.31 per flask. By
the end of the war in 1918, domestic consumption had climbed to 36,000 flasks,
and production had doubled to 32,000 flasks. Imports were at 6,600 flasks,
and world production, for the first time in several years, had fallen below
100,000 flasks. The munitions industry's demand for mercury fulminate had,
as early as 1916, pulled the average price per flask to $125.49, and in 1918 it
E&MJ YEARLY
Table V
AVERAGE MERCURY PRICES, 1900-19661
Year
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1. Source:
Price'
$ 51.00
47.00
48.03
41.32
41.00
38.50
40.90
41.50
44.84
46.30
47.06
46.54
42.46
39.54
48.31
87.01
125.49
106.30
123.47
92.15
81.12
45.46
58.95
Engineering and
(in current dollars)
Year Price
1923 $ 66.50
1924 69.76
1925 83.13
1926 91.90
1927 118.16
1928 123.51
1929 122.15
1930 115.01
1931 87.35
1932 57.93
1933 59.23
1934 73.87
1935 71.99
1936 79.92
1937 90.18
1938 75.47
1939 103.94
1940 176.86
1941 185.02
1942 196.35
1943 195.21
1944 118.36
Mining Journal.
Year
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Price
$134.89
98.24
83.74
76.49
79.46
81.26
210.13
199.097
193.032
264.386
290.348
259.923
246.978
229.057
227.484
210.760
197.605
191.208
189.451
314.787
570.726
420.
stood at $123.47.
Following the war, consumption decreased, imports rose, and average
price fell to a 1921 low of $45.46 per flask. The number of operating mines
dropped from 66 in 1916 to only 11 in 1921.
The following years of the 1920's constituted a period of industrial
boom. Consumption and mine production were both increasing and the price
steadily climbed to average 1928 and 1929 levels of $123.51 and $122.15, re-
spectively. In 1929, sixty-three mines were in operation.
The early 1930's were, of course, a time of depression. Consumers of
mercury shared the effects along with most other industries. Price and mine
output both tumbled, price hitting bottom in 1932 at $57.93. Production in
1933 was only 9,669 flasks, but for the next six years plateaued at around
17,000 flasks. The price situation gradually improved to $90.18 in 1937.
Remarkably, the number of mines in operation during the 1930's has not been
surpassed in American history except during the war years of 1940-1944. At
no time during those years of widespread depression did the number of
operating mines fall below seventy-five. Output, nevertheless, did drop.
In 1933, the 75 operating mines averaged fewer than 130 flasks output each.
During 1936 and 1937, it was feared that the Spanish Civil War would
cut off supplies of mercury from the world's most prolific producer. Hence,
over 18,000 flasks were imported in each of those years--nearly 2-1/2 times
the 7,800 flasks imported in 1935--largely for industrial stockpiles. The
resulting situation was one of oversupply and the 1938 average price to
American mines dropped nearly $15 to $75.47.
War broke out throughout Europe by 1939 and exports to the Western
Hemisphere were cut off. The task of satisfying wartime needs fell upon
domestic operators, with some assistance from Mexican sources. In 1941, a
record 197 mines were operating in the United States. Prices soared, and in
1942 the Office of Price Administration set a ceiling price of $191-193 per
flask. Production in 1943 reached 51,929 flasks, a modern record.
Prices suffered in 1944 because of that peak production, but were revived
somewhat in 1945 by the demand anticipated for the new mercury cell battery.
The failure of the promised demand to materialize plus the resumption of
importing from Europe caused a depression in the industry through 1950.
Prices settled at about $80.
Heavy stockpile purchasing by the federal government with counterpart
funds in Italy resulted in an unequaled import level in 1949--103,141 flasks.
Domestic producers reacted with all-time low output of 4,535 flasks from only
sixteen mines in 1950. This figure is less than nine per cent of the pro-
duction figure of but seven years previous.
But in 1950, war was again just around the corner. Due to the demands
of the Korean conflict, consumption hit 56,848 flasks in 1951. However, the
damage of low prices for too long was being felt. Too many mines had been
closed. The domestic industry could supply but 7,293 flasks. The 1950
average price of $82.26 soared to $210.13 in 1951, and as in World War II,
price ceiling controls were imposed. In spite of these controls, however, the
domestic industry was being rejuvenated.
From 1955 through 1959, strong industrial demand throughout the world
together with heavy purchases by the American, French, German, and British
governments combined to help keep prices firm and stable. The E&MJ yearly
average never fell below $227.48 and was as high as $290.35 in 1955. Domestic
production expanded, encouraged by strong demand, good prices, and a Government
support program which from July 9, 1954 through 1958 guaranteed domestic miners
$225 per flask.
Initially, United States producers continued to sell on the open market
where prices were $75 a flask higher than the Government's support price. As
the market slackened, however, producers turned more and more to the Federal
outlet with its secure price floor. Unfortunately, United States output
reacted slowly to the support program. In 1954, production was 18,543 flasks.
By 1958, it had finally managed to reach a "healthy" level--38,067 flasks--but
the Government program was ending and the price was being removed.
Production actually held fairly steady from 1959 (31,256 flasks), through
1961 (32,662 flasks). The decline hit in 1962 as output fell to 26,277 flasks
and then was accelerated in 1963 as--despite record high 77,963 flasks consump-
tion--output dropped to 19,100 flasks. By that time, the average yearly price,
falling since 1960, hit $189.45, the lowest since 1950. Some observers held
the slightly recessed national economy responsible for the producer's plight,
but other experts pinned the blame on the Government support program since it
artificially maintained prices while spurring delayed-action output increases.
Some Russian and Chinese mercury entered the London market in 1961 and
depressed prices there. By August, 1961, both Italian and Spanish sources
withdrew from the market, claiming that they simply would not sell at such
depressed prices. The Italians maintained a full production schedule while
stockpiling the output. The Spanish cut back production slightly. Markets
continued to flounder through 1962 in spite of a 10,000 flasks increase in
consumption and 5,000 flasksdecrease in production here.
By 1963 experts were predicting an imminent price up-swing. The first few
months, nonetheless, looked more dismal than ever. By September, however, the
Italians were beginning to set prices below which they would not sell. When
the Spanish, the only other factor powerful enough to defeat such a move,
tacitly complied, the price pendulum began to reverse direction. By the end of
the year, the E&MJ weekly price quotation had climbed to $228.
The next year, 1964, marked the start of the spectacular price surge with
which this report is primarily concerned. The E&MJ average price for the year
was $314.79. For 1965, the average price skyrocketed to $570.73. Figure 5
shows the weekly progressions of the price increase from 1963 through 1966.
Price Increase of 1964
What was the cause of this jump in price? How did it come about? As
previously mentioned, the Italians and Spanish had removed themselves as sources
from the market while stockpiling their output. After this move, world pro-
duction was insufficient to satisfy the world consumption of mercury and indus-
trial inventories were shrinking. When, in September, 1963, Monte Amiata, the
major Italian producer, announced minimum sales prices for its mercury, it
found many buyers willing to pay the price. Almaden, in Spain, then accepted
the Italian firm's decision, thereby establishing a solid worldwide pricing
base which no other nation's producers had sufficient power to undermine.
American producers had no difficulty in selling their output at the new higher
price. Monte Amiata had, it its unopposed and successful action, catapulted
itself into a position of worldwide pricing leadership.
The later portion of 1963 and part of 1964 saw a testing of the market by
Monte Amiata. Prices jumped weekly. Between February third and tenth of 1964,
mercury quotations went from $240 to $255, an increase of nearly four per cent
within a span of several days. Market experts were stunned by the steady
rising of prices and began to predict that the miners would overprice their
----
.188 Fig. 5
t -
Weekly age mercury price, 1964 through 1966
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product and prices would abruptly fall. Buyers, however, did not have the
requisite inventories to stay out of the market and check prices, which
continued rising firmly through February twenty-fourth--$265.
In March, the General Services Administration announced that "52,000
flasks of mercury have been found to be surplus to the Atomic Energy Comnission's
needs." Immediately purchasers became confident that their troubles were over.
Sellers, on the other hand, claimed that it would be some while before govern-
mental surpluses found their way into private industry. The net result of the
conflicting views was a stable market price between $260 and $268 from March
until July.
Laborers at Monte Amiata in June began a work slowdown that was to last
several weeks and aggravate an already tight supply situation. Shortly there-
after, Almaden announced that it was virtually all sold out for the rest of the
year. Furthermore, business circles were soon buzzing with the rumor that the
50,000 flask AEC surplus was to be absorbed by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. The sellers' market became very evident as a previously
somewhat-stabilized price rose from $268 at the end of June to $279 at the end
of July, $305 in August, $335 in September, and $370 by the end of October.
Deserate buyers were staying out of the market for weeks at a time, only
to add greater pressure on the market when they finally had to return for supplies.
Industry was bombarding the government with requests that the previously
announced surplus be made available. The Weed Ridge Chemical Company, by
September, had announced that it would "adjust its mercurial product prices
each week to reflect changes in the M&MM quote."2
1. "Mercury: Market Guide," E&MJ Metal and Mineral Markets, Jan. 25, 1965.
2. Ibid.
Plans were being announced for the reopening of mines forced to close
by the low prices of previous years. But the additional output would not be
immediately, nor would it be of sufficient quantity to appreciably alter the
supply outlook. The price was up to $385 on November second, leaped to $420
on November ninth, soared to $470 on November sixteenth, and settled to
$490 on November twenty-third--an increase of 30 per cent in just four weeks.
On November 13, eight months after the AEC surplus was first publicly
announced, the General Service Administration finally unveiled plans to
release at least 14,000 flasks of mercury at public auction in 1965. The
inmediate consequence was to substantially slow down the rate of price increase.
The GSA pronouncement fell in the middle of a week in which prices were rising
$50. The following increase was only $20, and thereafter prices failed to rise.
With the unevaluated, but threatening, likelihood of government disposal
sales hanging over the producers' horizon, producers adopted a wait-and-see
attitude. Exports to the United States are a significant protion of nearly all
non-Communist nations' sales of mercury, and the spectre of a possible market
collapse formed a powerful deterrent to further price hikes. That buyers, in
addition, now saw potential relief ahead caused pressure in a tight supply
situation to dissipate. The consequence was a fairly extended period of market
stability.
From November 23, 1964 through April 16, 1965--a span of twenty-two weeks--
price fluctuations were minimal. The highest quotation was $490 and the lowest
$475. Even the first GSA sale, which could have had a devastating effect, did
little to disturb the market stability.
In anticipation of the opening of the first bids for the GSA sale on
February fifth, the price declined $5 to $475. The bids ranged from $38 to
U$455.11 per flask. The GSA ultimately released 175 flasks at prices between
$425 and $455.11.
On February twenty-third, the GSA announced a sale of 10,000 flasks for
domestic consumption at $430 per flask on a first-come-first-serve basis. Thus
the discount from the open market price was less than 10 per cent. Shortly
thereafter, another 10,000 flasks were to be made available on the same basis.
The price was $460 per flask in lots over 500, and $475 per flask in lots under
500.
When, in late April, the supply situation was still remaining tight and
producers had judged that GSA releases would be sold as close to the open-
market price as was possible, i.e., that the GSA sales would not have a disrup-
tive effect on the market, another round of price increases was initiated.
Beginning at $485 on April 16, the price was to reach $700 by May 28. The
jump was generally attributed to tight supplies and GSA slowness in announcing
the next disposal sale of 10,000 flasks. When the announcement came prices
stablized at approximately $700 through mid-July. Between June and August,
the government released mercury at $685 per flask.
After July, the demand for mercury lightened. Major purchasers had been
able to build some inventories through the GSA sales. A tendency developed for
consumers to delay purchases, awaiting GSA announcements. Supplies also became
more abundant as reopening mines were adding their outputs to the market. In
brief, activity slumped and with it, price slowly fell. Periodic flurries of
activity caused temporary price hikes, but the trend was generally downward.
The year ended with a quotation of $535 per flask.
In the fourth quarter of 1965, the General Service Administration--after
additional industry-government conferences--announced a program of regular
-n
disposal sales. On the second Friday of each month, beginning in October,
1,500 flasks of mercury would be made to any bidder for quantities between one
and five hundred flasks.
The first sale, on October 8, saw 596 flasks were awarded at prices of
$600 and above. The open-market price at that time was $630. On November 12,
259 flasks were awarded at prices of $550 and above, and only 209 flasks could
be sold on December tenth at prices of $523.60 or higher. The open-market
prices at the time of the latter sales were $540 and $525 respectively.
Undoubtedly, some bidders ended up paying higher than open-market prices because
price conditions at that time were highly speculative.
For the quarter, the GSA could dispose of only 1,064 flasks slightly less
than 25 per cent of the 4,500 flasks available. The government program of
regular sales assured the consumer that he is not likely to be left without a
source of mercury in the event of a tight commercial supply situation. This,
in large part, was significant in relieving demand pressure and restoring the
open market to a more normal position.
The Market in 1966
Demand pressure diminishing and mine supplies starting to accumulate at
the start of 1966, the mercury market began a slow, but steady price decline.
Starting with a January 10, high of $525, the market price underwent a steady
weakening, with but one brief respite in April, to reach the year's low,
$330, by June 13. This was actually a continuation of a trend begun in
October, 1965.
One explanation of this trend may be that a large component of the active
buying of mid-1965 was an over-purchasing for the purpose of reestablishing
depleted inventories. A motivation for inventory purchases during a period of
mm-
rising prices was a fear that the market price would soar over the $1,000
mark.3
Thus an important share of 1966 demand may have in activity been satisfied.
Furthermore, when prices were declining, potential purchasers tended to post-
pone their buying, pending the further market weaknesses that were to come.
The brief April upturn was due to labor unrest at the Italian mines and
production slowdowns in Western Hemisphere operations due to the Easter
holidays. This situation was, of course, only temporary.
Stockpile sales by the General Services Administration did not play a
large role in the declining prices. In the January 14, sale, the GSA accepted
bids on only 660 flasks, with the low bid being $510 and the average $516.36
per flask. This compared with an open-market price of $525. The minimum GSA-
accepted price in February was $460, as compared to the month's average open-
market price of about $464. Only 265 flasks were released by the GSA at that
sale. All bids for the March sale were rejected by the GSA.
In April, the GSA sold 665 flasks at $385-$390. The New York market price
was $400-$415. The buyer, faced with having to pay freight from Oak Ridge
and the loss of commercial credit, realized little savings, however. Any poten-
tial savings to the consumer for May and June evaporated when the GSA rejected
all bids for those periods.
June marked the turning point in the 1966 market. During that month, the
Italian miners announced a floor price for their product of $350 plus tariff
($19./flasks). Furthermore, heavy rains hit American producers, slowing
3. Personal Communication. From metal broker who requested not to be identified.
activity and forcing some marginal mines, especially in Mexico, to close down.
Additionally, in July, Mexican government officials froze all mine shipments,
pending auditing of each mine's books, in an effort to curb smuggling, which
had reached major proportions. Prices consequently rose weekly from a June
low of $330 to a November 7 high of $574.
As prices rose, interest again turned to GSA stockpile sales. In July,
870 flasks were sold on bids between $350 and $360, compared to the open
market price of $365-$385. The August, September, and October GSA sales each
disposed of 1,500 flasks, the maximum available. Each was at prices within a
few dollars of the open market. The net effect may have been to partially
modify the price rise, but the price nevertheless continued to advance.
Monte Amiata, the leading Italian supplier, announced, in August, a
price rise to $406 (plus tariffs) and added that it had sold out its entire
1966 production. A further increase, to $532, was announced in September
for mercury to be delivered in 1967. Moreover, Italian mining was hit
again in October by labor unrest.
After November 7, prices fell off, declining for the remainder of 1966,
as demand slackened and Mexican supplies became more available. From a
November 7, high of $574, the market dropped to $475 by the year's end.
Prices in 1967 have been more stable than at any time since 1964. Fluct-
uations have not been great and the overall effect of GSA sales, as in prior
years, has generally been to stabilize prices. Average monthly prices, as
reported by the Engineering and Mining Journal, are as follows:
December, 1966 $484,524
January, 1967 485,762
% M ammob.- I- -
____V
February, 1967 $503,700
March, 1967 506,136
April, 1967 488,500
Prices have generally responded to consumer interest in the market.
It sagged to $450 briefly in June, but recovered again to $485 by August.
The most notable feature of 1967, has been the start of mercury trading
on the New York Commodity Exchange early in the year. Industrial opinion is
that mild price fluctuations may become greatly exaggerated if the often
violently speculative nature of other conmodity markets is extended to mercury.
CHAPTER VII
USES
The anticipated price level for mercury depends largely upon the future
level of demand. The United States Bureau of Mines classifies demand for
mercury into categories as follows:
Agricultural (including fungicides and bactericides for industrial
purposes) (Variable 5 of mathematical analysis--See Chapter
VIII)
Amalgamation (Variable 6)
Catalysts (Variable 7)
Dental Preparations (Variable 8)
Electrical Apparatus (Variable 9)
Electrolytic Preparation of chlorine and caustic soda (Variable 10)
General laboratory use:
Commercial (Variable 11)
Government (Not represented in quarterly data of Chapter VIII)
Industrial and control instruments (Variable 1)
Paint:
Antifouling (Variable 2)
Mildew proofing (Variable 3)
Paper and pulp manufacturing (Variable 4)
Pharmaceuticals (Variable 15)
Redistilled (Variable 16)
Other (Variable 17)
Usage Data
Historical data for these uses, as well as for total consumption, are
shown in the following charts. The sources of this data are the United States
Bureau of Mines Minerals Yearbook (from 1958) and United States Bureau of Mines
Mineral Industry Surveys (mercury, quarterly, from 1964). It should be noted
that paper and pulp manufacturing data were not separated from agriculture
until 1959, nor were data for mildew-proofing paint reported prior to that year.
Laboratory usage by the government is reported separately only for 1963 and 1964.
For other years, it is included within "Other".
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Substitution Effect
The demand curve for any typical commodity is characterized by a decrease
in quantities purchased as price is increased. Thus, unless the demand for
the commodity is perfectly inelastic, as the price rises, comparable items
become relatively less expensive and tend to be substituted for the more
expensive commodity.
In mercury, too this substitution effect will be noticed. But for many
of its uses, however, mercury behaves as a "highly inelastic material"--that
is, the price of the commodity has little to do with the level of demand.
Except for the role of inventories, the demand might be perfectly inelastic.
In the short-run, no other material can replace mercury and when inventories
are exhausted mercury must be purchases in the market regardless of price.
Physical Properties
In order to understand how mercury has become, for many uses, such a
highly inelastic commodity, it is necessary to explain why there are no
suitable substitutes. For this, one must examine the physical properties of
mercury itself.
Of all known metals, only mercury is a liquid at room temperature. In
fact, it does not solidify until the temperature has dropped to -38.85* C.
At 0* C, it has a specific gravity of 13.595, among the heaviest of all metals
or all liquids. As a conductor of electricity few metals can surpass mercury.
In addition, the rate of expansion of mercury with temperature is nearly
perfectly linear. Mercury will form amalgams or alloys with most other
metals, excepting iron. Furthermore, it will not wet glass, its surface
tension being 480.3 degrees per centimeter, compared to 75.6 for water.
Mercury is not oxidized by air or oxygen at room temperature, at which
its vapor pressure is only 2 microns. It is thus practically unique among
metals in that as a liquid it does not absorb gases. (Molten iron, for
example absorbs hydrogen; liquid copper absorbs oxygen.)
It is on various of these properties that the inelasticity of demand
for mercury is based. Substitutes, in many instances, are just not avail-
able. In other cases, substitutes are not economic, even at elevated mercury
prices, or would result in an inferior product.
Technological advances have two basic effects upon the usage of mercury.
It can develop entirely new uses. For example, the mercury cell battery was
developed during World War II. Or, secondly, it can make existing applications
obsolete. Fulminate of mercury, for instance, has been so thoroughly out-
moded as an explosive detonator that the Bureau of Mines ceased reporting usage
data for it as a separate category in 1954.
Additionally, technological advances affect the relative efficiency of
processes utilizing mercury and thus may lead to more ready substitution,
either favorable or unfavorable to mercury. Economically, this would increase
the sensitivity of mercury consumption to price for such a process. For
several present applications, such as in many control instruments, there is
no substitution for mercury and therefore its usage is independent of price.
Projections
For a detailed treatment of the many applications of mercury, the reader
is referred to an excellent report by D. R. Williamson.1 The emphasis here will
1. Williamson, D. R., "Mercury Prices and Consumption," Colorado School of Mines
Mineral Industries Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 3., May, 1965, 20pp.
be on obsolescence, substitutions, and new applications.
Agricultural usage faces a long-run decline. Because use is based upon
mercury's chemical, rather than physical, properties, mercury faces pronounced
substitution, especially at high prices. It is being replaced by organic and
copper compounds, which behave as effectively and are not as expensive. Pro-
jected yearly consumption is 1500 flasks.
Use of mercury for amalgamation was considerably above normal for 1964
and 1965. Projected usage, 300 flasks yearly, is more consistent with the stable
levels of 1954-1963, showing some slight yearly growth. The Homestake Mining
Company, largest gold mining company in the United States, consumes nearly
90 per cent of the mercury used in this category. Since 1962, its average
usage has been about 260 flasks yearly.2 It reports no possibility of substitu-
tion without major capital investments. Usage of more than 275 flasks yearly
is unlikely, however, since the mine is operating near its capacity. Small
amounts of mercury are used by the Primary Battery Division of Thomas A. Edison
Industries for amalgamating copper surfaces of parts. 3 That company expects
use to remain constant and reports there is no possibility of substitution.
The use of mercury as a catalyst is based, of course, on chemical pro-
perties. Its use in this area has been declining since 1947. Projected yearly
usage is 1700 flasks. Substitution is the major reason for its decline. A
2. Schmidt, Claude E., Metallurgical Superintendent, Homestake Mining Company,
Lead, South Dakota, Personal Connunication.
3. Thomas A. Edison Industries, Primary Battery Division, Bloomfield, New Jersey,
Personal Communication.
former use of mercury reports "mercury was used as catalyst in processes which
have become obsolete."4
The use of mercury in dental preparations is also subject to substitution.
Replacements include metal powder, porcelain, and plastics. Growth in usage
should result, however, from the expansion of dental services to a growing
population. Forecast use is 2200 flasks yearly. Between 1954 and 1964, the
use of mercury by dentists had increased 70 per cent.
Electrical apparatus is a consumer of large amounts of mercury. Growth is
closely connected with the national economy and substitution is often difficult
because of mercury's unique electrical and physical properties. Westinghouse5
uses mercury in rectifiers and electronic tubes and expects requirements to
decline, largely because of developments in solid-state and semi-conductor
devices. On the other hand, the S.S.T. Corporation,6 a dealer, expects
electronics to be an area of major development for the future. A long-run
estimate of usage is 12,700 flasks yearly.
Demand for mercury for construction of new facilities for the electrolytic
preparation of chlorine and caustic soda was a major contributor to the imbalance
of supply and demand leading to the increase in prices. One method involves
the use of a stream of slowly moving mercury as a cathode in a mercury cell.
4. Personal Conmunication from chemical company. Source confidential. (Informa-
tion here and at several subsequent points has been obtained directly from
relevant companies. Many of these have released data which they consider
confidential and have requested that their names not be published in connec-
tion with the data. Such instances will be footnoted as above.)
5. Marsh, Merle E., Purchasing Agent, Raw Materials, Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, Personal Communication.
6. Turner, G. H., S.S.T. Corporation, Personal Communication.
A non-mercury method is the "diaphragm cell." Both are of equivalent efficiency
and yield the same end products. Contaminants is present in caustic soda
generated from the diaphragm cell, but that from the mercury can be used for
making synthetic fibers without additional handling.
In January, 1965, eleven chlorine-caustic soda plants, using mercury cells,
were scheduled or planned. A 100 ton per day chlorine plant reported would
require 5,100 flasks for initial production.8 Additional flasks are required
for annual replacement of lost mercury. Several chemical companies9 estimate
a minimum of five per cent yearly growth in demand for mercury for this use.
One of these companies reports the mercury cell process would be profitable
until mercury prices rose to $800 per flask. Substitution is not likely. Some
decrease is to be expected, however, as construction of new facilities is
completed and initial requirements are satisfied. Projected usage is 6,000
flasks per year for replacement. Mercury required for new or expanded
facilities is concluded within "Other."
Conrrercial laboratory usage has been increasing since 1953. Westinghouse
estimates its requirements for this purpose will increase by five per cent
yearly.10 In general, however, demand should be price-sensitive, since mercury
is not being used for production and is not likely to be engineered into products
under high price conditions. Projected yearly usage is 2400 flasks.
7. Williamson, D. R., Op. cit., p. 16.
8. Ibid.
9. Personal Communications. Sources confidential.
10. Marsh, Merle E. Op. cit.
Governmental laboratory usage is expected to be less price-sensitive as it
is more likely to be concentrated on areas of national security. Details of
course, are not available, but prime areas of research are thought to involve
rocket parts and propulsion and atomic energy. Government stockpiles of mercury
are being depleted, however, by the GSA sales, to which the Atomic Energy Com-
mission has greatly contributed. This, necessarily, will have an effect upon
government research. Projected annual usage is 7,000 flasks.
For industrial and control instruments, the long-run consumption outlook
is 5,500 flasks per year. This has been an area of price sensitivity. Generally,
for flow- and orifice-meters, purchasers prefer the non-mercury type as being
less expensive to buy and easier to maintain. Demand for mercury meters is
declining. In other types of control units, demand is remaining level.
Anti-fouling paint is practically obsolete, being replaced by copper
oxide and plastic paints. Mercury mildew-proofing paint is currently popular, but
the outlook is for eventual substitution. Predicted annual demand is 100 flasks
and 6,000 flasks respectively.
The use of mercury in the paper and pulp industry is steadily declining.
The reason is that organomercurials are not allowed for use in slime control
in conjunction with the manufacture of paper and paperboard for food containers.
Since even newsprint ultimately finds its way, through waste paper, to mills
manufacturing paper and paperboard for food containers, there is less and less
desire to use organomercurials, even in mills not making food containers. Project-
ed annual usage is 1,000 flasks.
In the pharmaceutical field, antibiotics, sulfa drugs, iodine, and various
antiseptics and disinfectants are rapidly replacing mercurial drugs. The only
mercurial drug now in widespread use is mercurochrom. Projected usage is 2,800
flasks per year.
Although classified by the Bureau of Mines as a use, redistillation is
actually a component of secondary production. Its magnitude is not price-
dependent, but fluctuates, rather, with the scarcity of supply. For example,
was over 40 per cent greater in 1965 than in 1963. Since economic mercury
deposits are being more and more depleted, redistillation should assume more
importance. But since marginal mines are now opening to ease the lack of supply,
the projected demand for redistilled mercury, 10,600 flasks yearly, is below
the 1965 level of demand. Projected annual demands for other supply components
are as follows: mine production, 22,400 flasks; total secondary production,
16,000 flasks; imports, 38,000 flasks; total supply, therefore, 76,400 flasks.
The most fluctuating category of demand is "Other." At times, this has
included government laboratory usage and usages which would reveal confidential
company information if enumerated in separate categories. Also included is
usage for new or expanded chlorine-caustic soda facilities. Use for rocket
parts or fuel would also be included.
In 1948, 1951, 1953, 1955, 1957, 1958, 1962, 1963, and 1965, the leading
use of mercury was for "Other." Subject to possible intense fluctuations, the
anticipated long-run demand is 13,000 flasks per year.
The projected long-run demand for all uses, as defined by the Bureau of
Mines, is 76,400 flasks annually.
CHAPTER VIII
ANALYSIS
A major objective of this investigation is to determine, if possible, a
future equilibrium point of supply and demand and the resultant equilibrium
price. A demand consideration is that some new uses will unfold because of
advancing technologies. Some existing uses, through technological change,
may be made obsolete. Other applications will become uneconomical through
price increases over years past and, thus substitutes will be employed. These,
together, will cause fundamental changes in the demand curve and were reviewed
in Chapter VII.
Supply is affected by opening and closing of mines in response to price,
by changes in the scale of operations at producing mines, by imports, by
inventory policies of miners, dealers, and consumers and, not least importantly,
by government policies, concerning the acquisitions and disposals of stockpiles.
Methods
Three methods are utilized in an attempt to determine a stable long-run
price. The leastquantitative, but possibly most knowledgeable, are the opinions
of numerous industry leaders. Secondly, each source of demand (use) and source
of supply can be separately analysed and, by projection techniques, an
aggregate supply-demand picture may be developed. Most quantitative is a
mathematical treatment based on regression analysis and correlation techniques.
It is this method which will be discussed first.
Mathematical Analysis
Quarterly data from January 1961 through March 1966, were obtained from
the United States Bureau of Mines for each of fourteen usage catagories, as
well as for total usage, mine production, secondary production, imports, and
price. These data were imput to a computer in which a step-wise regression
analysis program determined the linear equation of best fit, according to
the sum-of-least squares criterion, for price as a function of all other
variables.
In addition to the equation of best fit, a covariance matrix and a
correlation matrix were computed for each pair of variables. The mean and
standard deviation were also calculated for each variable.
The quantities were found for each nine cases, in which price data were
related to usage data of the corresponding quarter, then to usage data of each
of the four preceding quarters, and finally to data of each of the four succeed-
ing periods. As a convention for subsequent discussions and charts, a time shift
is considered positive where usage leads the price and negative where price
leads usage. In other words, when the price of period Q + 1 is a function of
usage of period of Q, the time shift is defined as +1, but when the price period
Q - 1 is involved, the time shift is defined as -1.
Table VI shows the computed equations of best fit for each of the nine
cases. The variables are defined in Table VII. The usage and price data
imput to the computer are given by Table VIII.
Table VI
EQUATION OF BEST FIT
Case 1: Time Shift = -4
X g = 163.584 
- .234X1 -
.21 OX5 -
1 
.082X2 .066X3
- .728X7 + .249X8
.200X10 + .076X1 +
.108X15 + .104X16
.045X12 - .009X13
-
.027X1 4
Case 2: Time Shift = -3
= -1678.949 +
.210X5  -
.745X10 +
.236X15 +
.481X
5.912X6 +
.252X
2
.136X
7
- .058X3 +
-
.127X 8
.060X4
.057X9
.122X - .033X1 2 + .016X1 3 - .001X 14
.373X16
-
.262X4
.01OX
9
X 19
Case 3: Time Shift = -2
X19 = -217.654 + .493X1
.171X
5
.192X 10
.223X
1 5
.114X
3
- 2.836X6 + .516X7 - .778X8 - 1 9 +
- .089X - .O11X + .019X - .o11X -11 12 13 14
- .187X1 
- .160X + .147X8
Case 4: Time Shift = -1
x 19
= 210.229 + .505XI + .009X2
.006X5 
- 1.779X6
.186X
10
.114X15 +
.111 x11
+ 
.471X 7
.051X
3
-
.649X 8
.050X 12 + .012X13 - oliX
.057X 16 - .002X17
Case 5: Time Shift = 0
= 328.143 + .365X
.350X
6
.116X-
-
.016X
2
.353X
7
.045X
3
.564X8
-
.073X
4
+ 
.016X9
- .035X12 + .018X 
- 004X1
-
.003X 
17
.137X
4
.020X
4
.041 X
x 19
.01 4X5
.006X
10
Case 6: Time Shift = +4
= -3499.357 +
.958X
5
1 .958X 10
1 .167X
15
2.278X
12.117X
6
.173X I
.787X
16
+ 2.513X
2
-
.792X
7
-
.170X
12
- .132X 3
- .616X
+ 
.015X 13
.061X 
1 7
Case 7: Time Shift = +3
= -2285.298 +
1 .346X
10
1 .022X
15
1 .842X
10. 159X6
-
.164X 11
+ 
.978X2
+ 1.162X
7
-
.160X12
- .297X
-
.337X
3
1 .605X
8
+ .025X4
- .684X 9
.051X 13 - .033X 14
.290X
18
Case 8: Time Shift = +2
= 580.186 + .204X
.216X
5
.323X
10
.116X
15
- 2.180X 6
- .277X
-
.317X 2
+ 1.249X
7
-
.023X
3
-
.709X8
+ 
.385X 4
-
.040X
9
- .087X12 + .024X13 
- .021X14
-
.026X 17
x19
.030X 14
X 9
x 19
.098X 16
Case 9: Time Shift = +1
= 842.970 + .209X
.048X 5
.082X
10
.214X
15
- .882X 6
-
. 379X
-
.079X 1 6 -
-
.061X
2
.457X 7
- .061X12 +
.094X1 +
- .590X
8
-
.217X
4
- .076X 9
.015X13 + .005X 14 -
.075X
18
Table VII
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
1. Industrial and control instruments
2. Paint: Antifouling
3. Paint: Mildew Proofing
4. Pulp and Paper Manufacturing
5. Agriculture
6. Amalgamation
7. Catalysts
8. Dental Preparation
9. Electrical Apparatus
10. Electrolytic Preparation of Cl2 + NaOH
11. General Laboratory Use (Excluding Government)
12. Mine Production
13. Secondary Production
14. Imports
15. Pharmaceuticals
16. Redistilled
17. Other
18. Total Consumption
19. Price
Table VIII
QUARTERLY DATA INPUT FOR COMPUTER ANALYSIS
Industrial and
Control Instruments
xlI
1027
968
1052
1025
973
826
758
949
988
879
700
937
945
840
897
930
874
856
950
745
829
Antifouling
x2
236
388
205
76
61
46
31
117
68
233
112
89
30
112
53
36
Meldew Proofing
X3
998
1492
1297
1248
1669
500
999
1319
1673
2054
1468
618
1476
2362
678
1264
1756
2448
2364
978
2012
Pulp and Paper
Manufacturi ng
x4
807
628
712
389
1021
376
352
317
781
798
698
414
553
510
445
449
273
136
94
95
147
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Amalgamation
1029
401
540
433
921
1296
1545
1036
555
584
706
511
1112
593
839
661
768
959
666
733
838
206
152
138
147
128
119
136
153
119
190
124
127
126
52
231
278
292
81
109
152
149
157
172
100
124
143
158
168
352
132
434
478
540
535
378
376
521
590
517
495
501
607
529
524
443
743
510
441
339
151
206
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Agriculture Catalysts Dental Prep.
Electrical
Apparatus
Electrolytri
Preparation
of A + No0H
2
General Laboratory Use
Commercial Government
334
282
281
412
501
356
248
438
979
339
241
281
2669
2019
1987
2766
3048
1900
2696
2803
2770
1705
2678
2991
2630
1666
3107
2387
2530
3988
2261
3214
3231
1358
1355
1452
2030
1803
1792
1856
1856
1631
1995
2126
2180
2764
2463
2483
1915
1759
2107
1984
2769
2939
286
235
260
121
373 **
* Excluded from mathematical analysis
** Included in analysis as is commercial usage
1961
1962
1963
(340
(342
1516 (281
(323
1964 )
) 17,000 *
)
1965
1966
Secondary Production
x13
8150
8700
7220
7530
6420
6740
6670
6500
4760
5870
5100
3190
3030
3680
3190
3360
3955
5220
4830
4695
4255
x14
1300
4010
1570
1480
1250
1300
1550
1600
2150
1950
4650
1700
3061
1244
1936
6270
7652
9629
5298
9086
8234
12,577
10,238
12,028
12,339
11,499
10,316
6949
2100
1650
1300
18,700
12,400
14,900
14,200
4200
5215
3225
5550
3845
69772400
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Mine Production Imports
Pharmaceuticals
x15
484
570
730
735
1052
1046
655
580
675
1378
945
1081
1508
1843
897
1046
587
1043
836
784
1150
x16
2334
2275
1906
2499
2718
2121
1877
2314
2586
2359
1991
2278
2665
3229
2086
2960
3055
2912
3350
2587
2354
17
409
491
4160
744
6151
1394
929
3150
2275
5531
10,824
4743
1029
484
1303
3009
608
1240
12,075
1066
948
x18
13,400
12,400
16,200
14,000
22,100
13,200
13,800
16,900
16,600
19,500
24,600
18,100
17,000
16,400
14,700
17,100
14,200
17,800
27,200
14,700
16,300
19
$207.69
203.12
190.32
189.29
$191.17
192.00
192.00
189.67
$186.88
183.59
183.82
203.52
$252.49
265.12
300.78
440.76
$476.25
612.38
631.18
563.18
$459.48
369.00
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
Redistilled Other Total Pri ce
Table IX above shows the correlation of each variable with price for
each of the time shift cases. It appears significant that correlation of
price with total usage (Variable 18) is nearly inconsequential for all cases
tested.
Equations-of-best-fit and their associated time shift values, along with
the correlation values, appear to offer the most promising approach toward a
quantitative forecast of mercury prices.
As a first step, the computer, using its equation of best fit determined
a theoretical price for each quarter and compared the calculation to the
actual price. The difference, termed the "residual" (actual price - calculated
price) is tabulated below. (Table X) In this table are, also, for each case,
the average residual and the average of the absolute value of the residual:
R and- respectively where R = residual value and n = number of quarters
in each case.
Table IX
CORRELATION WITH
Time Shift
Variable +1 +2 +3 +4 0 -1 -2 -3 -4
-. 208
-. 066
+.368
-. 550
-. 094
+.681
-. 146
+.155
+.206
+.358
-. 327
-. 652
+.808
-. 041
+.211
+.661
-. 036
+.121
-. 205
-. 035
+.195
-. 415
-. 082
+.803
-. 223
+.319
+.163
+.554
-. 283
-. 787
+.638
+.203
+.371
+.566
-. 215
-. 005
-. 207
+.035
+.124
-. 326
-. 178
+.825
-. 214
+.378
+.034
+.695
-. 211
-. 881
+.416
+.473
+.543
+.515
-. 141
+.057
-. 254
-. 182
+.433
-. 733
-. 037
+.579
+.182
-. 423
+.393
+.382
-. 372
-. 413
+.755
-. 338
+.018
+.629
+.070
+.222
-. 289
-. 183
+.385
-. 842
-. 034
+.482
+.282
-. 659
+.369
+.442
-. 357
-. 307
+.533
-. 410
-. 069
+.503
+.047
+.169
-. 308
-. 163
+.312
+.698
-. 054
+.382
+.280
-. 748
+.447
+.535
-. 328
-. 213
+.367
-. 495
-. 085
+.308
-. 047
+.066
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
NOTE:
PRICE
-. 211
-. 144
+.356
-. 674
-. 046
+.612
+.056
-. 196
+.371
+.321
-. 379
-. 526
+.812
-. 233
+.018
+.645
+.021
+.159
+1.00
0.00
-1.00
represents perfect direct linear relationship
represents randomness (no relationship)
represents perfect inverse linear relationship
-. 229
-. 200
+.304
-. 629
-. 099
+.304
+.196
-. 755
+.333
+.524
-. 260
-. 156
+.282
-. 530
-. 095
+.246
+.033
+.114
-. 313
-. 237
+.203
-. 604
-. 099
+.259
+.285
-. 797
+.385
+.561
-. 266
-. 072
+.150
-. 558
-. 127
+.153
-. 107
-. 041
Table X
TABULATION OF RESIDUALS
Time Shift
Quarter -4
1
2
3
4
5 +0.92
6 -0.73
7 +1.71
8 -0.89
9 +0.09
10 -2.57
11 +1.91
12 +2.07
13 +0.16
14 +0.11
15 -1.80
16 +0.15
17 -2.63
18 -1.45
19 +3.29
20 -0.93
21 +0.59
R 0.00
n
RI 1.29
Ratio1  6.79
1. Ratio of
-2 -1
+0.55
-0.12
-0.40
+1.41
-1.63
+0.63
-1.58
+1.59
+1.39
+1.20
-0.32
-1.35
-0.64
-1.80
-0.51
+2.61
-0.45
-0.58
0.00
1.04
5.47
+1.90
-0.73
+1.57
+2.98
-5.03
+2.34
-2.33
-4.09
+3.79
+2.80
+3.41
-1.81
-8.96
-0.58
+6.41
-1.91
-3.69
-1.51
+5.45
0.00
3.23
17.00
-0.05
+0.77
-0.83
+1.01
+0.95
-2.18
+2.23
-1.17
-1.92
+1.15
-0.32
-0.63
+0.69
-0.69
+0.56
+1.10
-0.59
-1.17
-0.72
+1.81
0.00
1.03
5.42
min. IRI
0
+1.11
-10.67
+1.10
+8.33
-4.88
-5.36
+10.10
-6.72
+5.75
+10.39
-7.02
-13.18
-11.67
+7.11
+26.13
+0.14
-12.84
+6.83
+7.96
+4.84
-17.45
0.00
8.55
45.00
+1
+14.86
-29.60
+17.59
+7.37
-3.31
+10.02
-22.90
+17.27
-6.66
-16.28
+15.63
-29.18
-28.07
+25.31
+30.78
+6.45
-3.12
+5.28
-5.26
-6.19
0.00
15.06
79.26
+2
-26.63
-7.28
+22.07
-15.08
+34.13
+7.73
-25.10
+56.24
-19.45
-17.60
-4.60
-40.83
-47.99
+29.82
+55.25
+19.96
-8.06
-0.38
-12.20
0.00
23.71
124.79
+3
-12.24
+9.11
+2.07
-10.99
+5.79
-0.32
+4.24
+8.16
-0.94
+3.98
-7.58
-3.51
+1.81
-5.30
+7.35
+2.31
-5.00
+1.04
0.00
5.10
26.84
+4
-0.73
+0.43
+0.05
-0.23
+0.40
+0.13
-0.00
+0.42
-0.13
-0.14
-0.28
+0.03
-0.12
-0.02
-0.18
-0.01
+0.01
0.00
0.19
1.00
In each case it can be seen that the positive residuals counter-
balance negative residuals, so that the linear equations of Table VI indeed
qualify as "best fit." The question now remains as to which of the equations
is better than the others. The calculations of average absolute residual,
shown in Table X, indicate that the equation of Time Shift +4 is easily the
most satisfactory, although the negative time shifts may also lend to
reasonable equations. Comparisons among cases are facilitated by calculation
of the ratio of average absolute residual (for each time shift) to minimum
average absolute residual.
It may be significant that the equation of Time Shift +4 results in the
minimum residual for fourteen of the seventeen quarters to which it could be
applied. The equation seems especially accurate for the latter quarters,
those which deviated most drastically from the relatively stable price levels
of the early 1960's. The implication is that the mercury market, as a whole,
is one in which the demand at a particular time is a major influence on the
price at least four quarters hence.
In other words, considering the mercury market as a whole, the price level
appears to be particularly sensitive to source of supply and demand at least
four quarters previous.
The relatively low average absolute residual values of the -1, -3, and -4
Time Shift equations might indicate that a few sources of demand are sensitive
to the price levels of previous quarters. Their behavior is contrary to the
behavior of the market as a whole.
In order to determine how a particular source of demand (or supply) reacts
with market price, it is necessary to refer to the tabulation of coefficients
of correlation with price for each time shift--Table IX. The variables are
defined in Table VII.
Those cases which have economic meaning are as follows:
1. High positive correlation in positive time shift: Change in demand
influences corresponding change at later period.
II. High positive correlation in zero time shift: Immediate change in
price in same direction as change in demand; or immediate change in supply in
same direction as price change.
III. High negative correlation in negative time shift: Change in price
influences opposing change in demand at later period.
IV. High negative correlation in positive time shift: Change in supply
influences opposing price change at later period.
V. High negative correlation in zero time shift: Immediate change in
demand opposing price change; or immediate change in price in opposing change
in demand.
VI. High positive correlation in negative time shift: Price change
influences corresponding change in supply at later period.
VII. Low positive or negative correlations in all time shifts: Unclear
or random relationship between supply or demand and price.
From Table IX, the variables can be classified into cases, as defined
above. Correlations between 0 and .500 are not considered significant.
I
Amalgamation
Electrolytic preparation of chlorine and caustic soda
Pharmaceuticals
Redistilled
100
II
Amalgamation
Secondary Production
Redistilled
III
Pulp and Paper Manufacturing
Dental Preparation
Mine Production
Pulp and Paper Manufacturing
VI
Secondary and Production
VII
Industrial and Control Instruments
Antifouling Paint
Mildew - Proofing Paint
Agriculture
Catalysts
Electrical Appartus
General Laboratory Use
Imports
"Other" uses
Total Usage
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The category which supports the contention that price is largely dependent
upon the level of demand in past periods is Category I. This is supplemented
from the supply viewpoint, by Category IV.
Of the four variables in Category I, amalgamation, pharmaceuticals, and
electrolytic preparation of chlorine and caustic soda all have the greatest
positive correlations in the +4 Time Shift. Mine production is the only supply
source in Category IV. Its most negative correlation is likewise in the +4
Time Shift.
The correlation factors of mine production and electrolytic preparation
of Cl2 and NaOH in the +4 Time Shift are not exceeded by any other variable
in any time position. It is significant that nearly all informed sources
interviewed (miners, dealers, consumers, state officials, etc.) mentioned
either lack of mine supply or increased consumption by chlorine and caustic
soda plants or both as the prime cause, in their opinions for the rapid increase
in the price of mercury.
Simulation
Of the nine equationstherefore the one most suitable for forecasting is
that of Time Shift +4. Given data of any specific quarter, one should be able
to forecast the price four quarters hence. The residuals for that equation,
in Table 5, testify to its efficiency with known data. A test of the equation
is to use the last known quarterly data that of I, 1966 (Table 3) to predict
the average price of I, 1967.
Averaging the monthly price quotes for January, February, and March, 1967,
as reported in the Engineering and Mining Journal, the average price for that
period is $498.53. The price forecast by the equation is $763.34. The residual,
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in this instance, is -$264.81, several magnitudes higher than any previously
encountered.
There is an obvious need to improve upon the equation of Time Shift +4
if the quantitative data available is to be of use in forecasting. For this,
data on correlation of each variable with price were examined to determine,
if possible, which time shift positions were most relevant to the individual
variables. With these and the nine computer-derived equations, synthesis of
a new, perhaps more meaningful, equation was anticipated. The available
quarterly data were used as test data.
A number of new equations were tested. Not one satisfactorily met its
objectives. Residuals, each time, were high. The price per flask was often
unrealistically high--over $1000--or even became negative.
Simulation, using the test data of Table VIII, proved completely unsuccess-
ful. Possibly, then, projected data for supply and demand might hold more
promise in conjunction with the mathematical analysis.
Projection Analysis
It is possible, by analyzing each use and source of supply and demand
separately, to project consumption figures for an estimated five years from
now. It is of interest to test the nine computer-derived equations with these
data.
The projections are as follows (in flasks per quarter):
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Table XI4
PROJECTED QUARTERLY SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR MERCURY
Xi Industrial and control instruments 1375
X2  Antifouling paint 25
X3 Mildew-proofing paint 1500
X4  Pulp and paper manufacturing 250
X5  Agriculture 375
X6  Amalgamation 75
X7  Catalysts 425
X8 Dental preparation 550
X Electrical apparatus 3175
X10  Electrolytic preparation of C12 and NaOH 1500
X General laboratory use 600
X12 Mine production 5600
X13  Secondary production 4000
X14 Imports 8500
X15 Pharmaceuti cal s 700
X16 Redistilled 2650
X 7 Other 3250
X18 Total consumption 18,100
X Price--not projected
Below are the price forecasts from each equation:
4. Projected from Figures 6-11, Chapter VII.
Table XII
PRICE FORECAST FOR EACH TIME SHIFT
Time Shift, Price Forecast
-$162.34
1180.92
688.95
332.74
424.20
509.80
812.62
154.60
153.87
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The above projections, obviously, are inadequate for any quantitative
forecasting. The +4 Time Shift case which, for correlation analysis consider-
ations, seemed promising yields a negative price. The t 0 Time Shift case
predicts a price of $424.20. This may very likely be a realistic and reliable
forecast. However, its general credibility is diminished by the overall
inconsistency of the remaining forecasts obtained from projected data.
Expert Opinion
Thus the quantitative results obtained from quarterly test data and pro-
jected usage data---with the possible exception noted above---must be rejected.
The remaining method of analysis is the "expert" opinion of numerous industry
leaders.
Opinions were solicited from nearly 200 firms involved with the mining,
trading, and consuming aspects of the mercury industry. Of these, 84 replied;
several saying only that the requested information could not be released or
was not known, others referring to published literature. Some of the opinions
of the remaining 59 firms have been cited elsewhere in this investigation.
It is significant only sixteen of these ventured quantitative estimates
of the long-run price of mercury. The majority seem to feel that too many
external factors (such as labor disputes and governmental actions) are involved
to make possible an intelligent guess. Dealers, probably most knowledgeable of
all, generally regard this information as extremely confidential. One noted
that its future price estimate, in the particular case of mercury, is not even
made known to a large portion of its office staff. 5
5. Personal Communication from dealer. Source confidential.
1o6
Hence, typical non-qualitative replies include: "Our purchases of
mercury are not of sufficient volume to qualify us as experts. We do not feel
competent to render opinions on the subject of mercury pricing." 6  "Any
information given here would be from trade papers rather than experience." 7
"No estimate--due to uncertainties caused by imports and U. S. government sales. 8
"The price of labor (will determine the long-run price of mercury)." 9
Quantitative opinions were tabulated by taking the mid-point of any
cited price range and rounding to the nearest twenty-five dollars. In addition
to the sixteen replies from firms in the industry, a thorough search was made
of literature published since 1963. Only one estimate was found there and is
included in the tabulation below.10
$250:
$300:
$325:
$350:
$375:
Table XIII 1
INDUSTRIAL PRICE OPINION
Chemical company *
Chemical company *
Electronic equipment manufacturer *
Chemical company *; Chemical company *; Thomas A. Edison Industries,
Primary Battery Division; chlorine and caustic soda manufacturer. *
Instrument manufacturer *
Personal Communication from petroleum company. Source confidential.
Personal Communication from utility. Source confidential.
Personal Communication from mining company. Source confidential.
Personal Communication from miner. Source confidential.
Bailey, Edgar H., and Prscoe M. Smith, "Mercury--Its Occurrence and Economic
Trends," Geological Survey Circular 496, Washington: U. S. Geological
Survey, 1964, p. 6.
Personal Comnunication except Bailey and Smith (above).
Source confidential.
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6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
*
$400: Westinghouse Electric Corporation; S. S. T. Corporation (dealer);
Buttes Gas and Oil Company (Gambonini Mine); Culver-Baer Mercury
Mines.
$425: Consumer (amalgamation) *
$450: Bailey Meter Company
$500: Bailey and Smith; Mining company *
$800+: Mining company *
Weighted average: $406
It should be noted, from the above tabulation, that as a rule consumers
estimate low and miners high. Both, no doubt, tend to be somewhat unrealistic
here. Unfortunately, the result will be that several marginal mines will
reopen in anticipation of high or rising prices only to meet with financial
disaster. This has happened at every period of high prices in the past. Only
a fraction of the marginal mines can make a profit over the long run. But one
need only consult the Engineering and Mining Journal each month to compile a
lengthy list of mines being reopened.
* Source confidential.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Has this investigation and analysis perhaps been done in vain? Is
there possibly no answer to the question, "What will be the future long-run
price of mercury?"
Over the short-run, G. D. Barth, in his Engineering and Mining Journal
review of 1966 mercury developments, states it is impossible to predict average
1967 11967 prices."
Concerning long-run market implications for minor metals such as mercury,
David Brooks, in an extension of his doctoral work, is equally pessimistic:
"If events of recent years have proved anything, it is that there is no fixed
demand for major metals, much less for minor metals; there is only a demand for
materials that can perform certain functions in certain ranges of cost. Given
this situation, it may be that the concept of long-run demand does not have
much meaning for many minor metals. Rather, there is a series of new and
sometimes quite different short-run demand situations. As a result, it is not
possible to take a given demand situation and project to the period when
expansion schedules will be complete and other dynamic forces will have worked
themselves out."2
1. Barth, G. D., "Mercury," Engineering and Mining Journal, Vol. 168, No. 2.,
February, 1967, p. 143.
2. Brooks, David B., Supply and Competition in Minor Metals, Washington:
Resources for the Future, Inc., 1965, p. 22.
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Despite these outstanding objections, the writer does make a price forecast.
On the basis of the evidence he has seen, it appears that the future long-run
price of mercury will be approximately $400, with fluctuations of varying
intensity about this price.
The writer concedes that much additional research could have been done
which could have materially affected the conclusion he has reached. The most
significant shortcoming of this investigation is the lack of a definitive
mathematical model. Different equations would have resulted had restrictions
been placed on the signs of the coefficients pertaining to each variable in
the equations of best fit. Variables of demand would have been kept positive
and those of supply kept negative to be consistent with economic logic.
Future research might benefit by investigating other mathematical
approaches. Simulation techniques in conjunction with dynamic programming and
feedback systems would appear to be particularly beneficial. A macroeconomic
approach, such as has been used in the cases of copper and aluminum, might be
attempted, although the writer feels that such a method loses much of its
relevance when the sales of a commodity is more influenced by technological
change than by overall economic growth. Improvements could also be effected
in the projected data fro the usage analysis. The method used in this investi-
gation did not explicitly consider the interaction of the data with price.
Further investigation would benefit other areas also. Little was said
about the role of imports, although the United States relies on foreign sources
for nearly half its mercury. Inventory levels have a psychological effect on
buyers and should be more thoroughly explored. Data on historic and current
mining costs are rarely published, but would contribute greatly to a better
understanding of the supply side of the market.
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Finally, a 1967 development is the beginning of mercury trading on the
New York Commodity Exchange. Historical data are absent, but the situation
should be watched closely for new insights into the nature of the mercury market.
To summarize briefly, the high cost of mercury was a result of supply and
demand imbalance. Scarce supply was a result of years of low prices postponing
the development of needed reserves. Prices had not kept pace with rising labor
and processing costs. The situation was critically aggrevated by labor slow-
downs at a time when inventories were low.
Demand shared a causative role in the high price. Consumption has been at
a high level for several years and at a crucial time industrial inventories
proved insufficient. The market was especially strained by the demands of
chlorine and caustic soda plants for large quantities of mercury with which to
start production at new facilites.
Correlation analysis indicates that the market is more responsive to
demand than to supply. Otherwise, quantitative analysis of quarterly and
projected data has not been impressive. The most reasonably prediction from
these equations is a long-run price of $424.20. Industrial sources yield an
average price forecast of $406.
The writer concludes that if it is possible to predict long-range prices
at all, a realistic estimate is $400 per flask. There are several areas in
which the forecasting methods used might be improved and some have been suggested.
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